




AN EVALUATION, OF' THE':
UNITED STATES SHELTER PROGRAM.
RICHARD H. PIERCE










B.S., 1959, University of Maine
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the School of Government,
Business, and International Affairs of The George Washington
University in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Business Administration
June 7, 1961
Thesis directed by
Arlin Rex Johnson, Ph.D.
Professor of Business Administration
1CSJ
i




LIST OF TABLES v
INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter






People? Republic of China
The Future






















Medical Consequences of Radiation











National Policy on Evacuation
Rand Study on Warning and Movement




A Cross Section Analysis
Relationship of Governmental Responsibility
Status of Shelter Program
A Bird'e-L've View
United states Congress, Civil Defense Hearings
Supplementary Problems
III. A PRACTICAL SHELTER PROGRAM 72




A Consideration of Proposed Shelters
An Immediate Program—Rand
A Delayed Program—Stanford Research Institute
A State Program—Rockefeller Proposal
for New York State
Budget Requirements
Side Effects
IV. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 87
National Policy
The Federal Civil Defense Agency
Creation of Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization
The National Plan for Civil Defense
and Defense Mobilization
The National Shelter Plan
State Participation
Federal Participation













Shelter and Public Acceptance







1. Caloulated Performance of Alternate
Shelter Systems under Various
Attacks 39
2. 150-City Attack 40
3. Possible Recuperation of dross National
Product after 50-City Attack 46
4. Federal Funds for Non-Military Defense . . 80
5» A Comparison of Appropriations 80

INTRODUCTION
The question of survival during a nuclear war has never
faced the United States more vividly and dramatically than in
this present era. Arrayed within the heartland of Soviet Russia
are countless thermonuclear weapons of terrifying destructive-
ness which can be launched against military targets and cities
within the United States. Equally formidable are the defensive
and offensive capabilities of America's military might that
stand ready to reply to any Soviet attack.
Compounding the political and social issues are the
military and economic races that exist between the two
countries continuously threatening to engulf the world into
a. nuclear war. For the first time since 1815 the United States
is faced by an armed attack capable of penetrating the peri-
meter of its shore lines—an attack that will not discriminate
between soldier and civilian or military targets and cities.
It is a tragic deficiency of our military resources that no
defense can completely prevent a well-executed enemy air
offensive from inflicting irreparable damage on the population
and cities of the United States. The character of modern war
has now shed the armor from American isolation and has exposed
our innermost hiding-places to the threst of nuclear
destruction:

It would be characteristic of a nuclear war that the
effects of high yield weanons would not discriminate
between soldiers and civilians. Consequently, the
combination of high speed delivery systems and powerful
nuclear weapons underscores the importance of total
defense. . . . The character of the threat has changed
since the hostilities in World War II and Korea. In
the event of attack today every family in the United
States could find itself on the front lines—because
the front lines would be on the home-front. 1
The probability and possibility of these two v.orlds of
political and economic difference reaching an agreement to
deter and possibly end this close contest for military supre-
macy is conjectural. A consideration of Communist doctrine
and goals is necessary before an objective conclusion can be
drawn. President Kennedy saye
:
The truth is that we are caught in a vicious circle
coirorised In p'rt of the arms race and in part of
political conflict. For us, this vicious circle of
two p-rrat powers contending with each other for sway
over the dfstiny of man is compounded by the new
dynamics of an expansive world Communism, armed with
revolutionary doctrines of class warfare and modern
methods of subversion and. terror.
2
In the meantime, each country continues at headlong
pace attempting to unearth the technological secrets not yet
revealed in order to gain "the" decisive military advantage.
General Medaris, a noted exponent of the like-Zeus missile
system, ssys:
It may not be technically possible to construct an
Paul C. McGrath, Defense in the Nucl ear Era . A
Briefing presented by the Deputy director of Intelligence
and National Security Affairs, Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization (Washington, Q. c.: February 21, 1961), p. 18.
p
John F. Kennedy, The j tra tegy of Peace (New York:
Harper and Brothers, I960), p. 2^.~"

3absolute defense against ballistic missile attacks,
but I insist that we can develop a weapon of suitable
capability to tip the balance of power. When we can
do something the aggressor cannot do, we will have a
positive deterrent.
5
The first atomic weapons dropped on Nagasaki and
Hiroshima are small compared to weapons and methods of delivery
developed for military specialists of today. Outstanding in
America's arsenal are thermonuclear weapons like Atlas, Titan,
Minuteroan and Polaris— to say nothing of the space program of
the future. It is readily apparent the furious rush of both
countries roust some day reach an impasse. Whether this will
be of a peaceful nature or a nuclear exchange only the dictates
of time and circumstance will determine:
Herman Khan has a firm belief that unless we have
more serious and sober thought on various facets of
the strategic problem that seems to be typical of
most discussions today, ... we are not going to
reach the year 2000—and maybe not even the year
1965—without a cataclysm of some sort, and that
this cataclysm will prove a lot more cataclysmic
than it needs to be.^
On the other hand, a task force report to Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller states:
We do not believe that nuclear war is inevitable.
We are confident that our nation s resourcefulness,
wisdom, and purpose at the conference table will
succeed in protecting world peace. If a test of
military strength, however, does become necessary,
we believe that our people and our democratic society
'— » h i 11—— in —WW—M I m iipii —i n . '—! mwii —l|WHmmmmmmu tu \ » i n——WW—i
—
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vJohn B. Medaris, Countd own for Decision (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, I960), p. 283.
4Herman Khan, On Thermonuclear war. Summary by
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, PAC Paper, No. 1A,
January 27, 1961, p. 1.

4can be successfully defended.
5
From an overall standpoint it would seem that America's
efforts to attain a posture of military preparedness have to
date been successful. At least It can be said our deterrent
force has so far cautioned the Russians from initiating any
overt act against us. The question is how long this military
stalemate will maintain us in this exclusive position.
The gradual shift from possession of an atomic monopoly
toward a position of virtual nuclear parity with the Soviet
Union has deprived the United States of a significant military
advantage, "it can no longer regard its massive striking power
so effective a deterrent to aggression or as a guarantee of
victory at acceptable cost in the event of the ultimate test
of war. The growth of Soviet nuclear power, together with
the maintenance of huge conventional forces in the Communist
bloc, has compelled the United States and other free nations to
be prepared for a wide variety of military moves the Communist
powers might make—from the fermenting of civil conflict to the
launching of an all-out war.
It is recognized there are many situations that can
cause nuclear conflict--both premeditated and unpremeditated.
Foremost among them is an accidental discharge of a nuclear
^Special Task Force Report to Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller, "Protection from Radioactive Fallout," July 6,
1959, cf., p. 5.
U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Basic
Aims of United States Foreign Policy," American Strategy
for the Nuclear Age , eds. Walter F. Hehn and John C. Nerf
(New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., I960), p. 9.

5weapon. In addition, a local war might become so vested with
national interests and prestige that Soviet leaders, if faced
with decisive defeat, would choose to counter with an all-out
attack. This danger has probably increased because Khrushchev
seems less cautious than Stalin, less secure in his grasp of
power, yet freer to exercise his diplomacy on a global scale.
War might occur because of miscalculation of United States
intentions; in a period of scute tension, verbal and even
military indicators would be diffioult to interpret, and the
premium on a first strike might well tempt the U;3SR to launch
Q
a pre-emptive strike.
It has been recognized for many years that manned
bombers can breach United States defense? and some will reach
their targets. It has only recently been brought home the
complete ineffectiveness of our defenses against enemy
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM*s). To fill the
vacuum and provide any real defense to the nation would require
a large number of Isike-Zeus anti-miasils missiles. It has been
estimated that a systeiii capable of stopping something like a
700-missile attack would mean building about 25 defense centers
and 2000 Zeus missiles at a cost near |$ billion. ^ it is
estimated that the lead time which must be expended on such a
'The Hand Corporation, Report on a Study of Non-




The Washington Post, February 22, 1961, p. 1.

6complex system would not permit this apparatus to be developed
prior to 1970. 10
The uncertainty of Soviet action, combined with the
uncertainty of United States action; the destructive power of
a single nuclear weapon; the delivery capability of ballistic
missiles; an ineffectual warning system; an apparent ineffective
defense against ICBM's; the widespread vulnerability of cities;
and the slow reaction times of large civilian population points
up the immensity of the issues that have to be considered.
Of grave and terrible concern to responsible officials is the
prospect of survival following a nuclear holocaust. The possi-
bility of losing tens of millions of American lives on the one
hand or in saving tens of millions on the other is appalling
indeed.
Alleviating the consequences of a nuclear war is
an important objective in its own right. Even if
a plausible attack a few years from now killed as
many as 90 million Americans, it would still leave
90 million alive. However, terrible the prospect,
it would be worth investigating whether there are
measures that might increase the number of survivors
from 90 million to 120 or 150 million and that the
survivors could, in time, restore the national economy
and democratic institutions. 12
While deterrence can be the most desirable function of
non-military defense, an adequate civil defense program has
other vital advantages even if the primary function falls and
-^John B. Medaris, loc. clt .
The Rand Corporation, op. cit . . p. 3.
12
*.Ibid
. , p. 1.

7war does break out. Life-saving protection is available to the
bulk of the population, and a foundation for post attack
recovery is provided. Mr. Rogers Cannell is of the opinion,
Non-military defense programs have a key role in
preventing a "cold war" from becoming a "hot war".
The United States announced policy of nuclear retalia-
tion in response to major aggression can hardly
convince the Russians unless we are also capable of
withstanding an attack. 13
It is obvious there is present a problem of considerable
magnitude. The desirability of adopting a non-military defense
program at any particular scale of cost can only be evaluated
in a broad context. This requires not only an examination of
the Soviet threat and its relationship to the overall civil
defense picture, but an understanding of all the important
facets surrounding the civil-defense program in the United
States. One element in the problem would be the attitude of
United states voters to support heavy appropriations for such
a purpose. Another element is the estimated performance and
cost of national-defense expenditures. The dependence of the
defense of civilian society on the effectiveness of United
States strategic-offense and active-defense capabilities should
be stressed."!^ i^on-military defense measures must be evaluated
not only with respect to feasibility, but also in their
interaction with other aspects of national defense. They
should not carry such high economic costs that United States
15Rogers Cannell, "The Strategic Role of Civil Defense,"
American Strategy for the Kuclear Age (New York: Doubleday
and Co. Inc., I§o0), p. ??X
x The Rand Corporation, op. cit . . p. 3.

8strategic offense, air defense, or local war forces would be
1Rdangerously weakened. J
It is the purpose of this thesis to evaluate the United
States shelter program within the context of the overall civil-
defense program. The selection of the shelter program as the
theme of this evaluation is based on the assumption that there
would be no civil-defense without a shelter program. This is
adequately supported by the Wisconsin Case Study:
In analyzing the programs required for non-military
defense and the role of government, fallout shelters
will be considered first, for the provision of shelter
at least against fallout is the most Important element
of any serious program for non-military defense. Without
such shelter, tens or scores of millions who might
otherwise survive would receive lethal or near-lethal
exposures to radiation. . . .16
It is believed basic that an understanding of the
afore-mentioned problems relating to the civil-defense effort
is required in order that an unbiased appraisal of the entire
shelter program be gained. It would hardly be practical to
conclude that the country needs shelters on the basis that
shelters ?re a protection from radiation, and then to determine
that radiation would destroy the nation's future capability for
production of food. It would likewise be a waste of resources
to build an expensive civil-defense system of shelter protection
without first determining the capability of our military
13 Ibid .
Hon-Mllltary Defense, Wisconsin: --A Case Study , ed
.
William K. Chipman. Proceeding of a Conference at The Wisconsin
Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, October 1-3, 1959,
p. 19.

9defenses to deny an enemy attack.
These are only a few of the many considerations that
are woven into this complicated web. Take, for example, Mr.
Morgenetcrn's views on the problem:
Nobody has shelter; there is no place to hide in
safety should a large thermonuclear war break out.
There is no place for anyone to go, not for the
masses, not for the common man, either in the United
States, or in Russia, or in -Europe; nowhere. Only
the heads of government and the top military commanders
-re relatively safe
—
provided, they can reach their
deep shelters" within half an hour or within two to
three minutes, depending on the tyoe of attack. Both
the governments and military leaders have always been
in safer spots than the common man— since time
immemorial. They are trying to preserve this
position. 17
So the problem poses itself—whether a country sua and should
take measures for passive defense, by building shelters, by
storage of food, medicines and equipment. With so many
imponderable factors entering the balance, the issue is one of
Judgment, in which the protection expected from offensive,
deterrent weapons must be balanced against that to be expected
from passive defenses. 18 It rflS y be that there is no point to
this—that the only salvation lies in the avoidance of war
through enormous military expenditures or international agree-
ments on disarmament. If war should occur, it may be of such
violence that no amount of passive protection would be
effective. The question resolves itself to feasibility, costs
^'Askar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense
(New York: Random House, 1959) » p. 9.
•jo








Nearly all the authorities of non-military defense,
including the Rand Report, the Rockefeller Report and,
reportedly, the celebrated Geither Report to the President,
conclude that Bhelter can be provided at reasonable cost.-^
" If we do not change our way of life slightly, these authorities








NATURE OF THE THREAT
Soviet Role
Assessment
It is imperative in estimating the requirements of a
massive civil-defense program that an appraisal be made of the
enemy in order that a reliable foreoast of the nation's needs
be determined. It is likewise necessary that a comparison of
the two opposing systems--communism and free world--be acquired
in order to determine the breadth and scope of the issues facing
us.
United States Objectives
The enduring objectives of the United States in world
affairs are to safeguard its own way of life, and to promote the
liberty, well-being, and progress of all mankind. These
objectives call for the defense of the independence of nations
and for the reduction, if not the prevention, of friction and
conflict between them.* President Kennedy has summed it up:
•'•The American Assembly, "Goals for Americans," The
Reoort of the President's Commission on National Goals




MOur purpose is to demonstrate at home that this great con-
tinental democracy can solve its problems by the method of
consent—by a system of freedom under law." 2 The old order
has been shattered by two great world wars, and for more than
a generation the world has been in a process of radical trans-
formation. The most powerful nations are ideologically divided
and wrought by technological achievements, the results of which
have been to revolutionize warfare to the extent of threatening
all mankind with destruction.
The present world situation is far from acceptable to
the American people confronted by a cold war with its
idological, military, and economic relationships. ^ No doubt
many necessary changes will be brought about by force and
violence as countries contest with each other over national
and international issues. It must be the aim of the United
States to reduce the en.ployment of force and to encourage the
use of peaceful means for settling disputes. The Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, said:
The great question is whether the United States can,
concurrently, act decisively to meet the succession
of threats and challenges from the Communist bloc
as they arise and also add new dimensions to its
foreign policy by taking measures i imed at the .
world s other problems and at the longer-term future.
o
John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (New York:
Harper and Brothers, I960), p. 5.
3 The American Assembly, loc. cit .
4
U. S, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Basic
Aims of U. S. Foreign Policy,"' American Strategy for The
Nuclear Age , ed. Walter F. Hahn, John C. Neff (New York:
Doubleday and Co. Inc., I960), ;',. 15.

13
If, however, the situation deteriorates to the point where
decisive action is required, the United States must, above all,
have the will and power to resist with arms any attempt to
bring about fundamental changes by military action on the part
of Communist countries.
Soviet Objectives
The great Communist nations of Soviet Russia and the
Chinese People's Republic have long openly avowed their
intention of burying the democratic system and organizing the
nations of the world in a new Communist order.-' This conflict
of political and social philosophies and systems has of recent
years spread over an ever-widening front. To political warfare
of the propaganda and subversive types, tha Communists have
added economic and technical aid programs clearly designed to
establish their influence and, eventually, their control over
uncommitted regions of the globe. Of equal, if not greater,
importance is the striking growth and rapidly mounting strength
of the Communist states, economically as well as politically
and militarily.
It has been thought and advanced by some experts that
the economic and political changes occurring since Stalin's
death would create a corresponding change in outlook and
objective which would dampen revolutionary ardor and create
among the Soviets a more strictly national interest in
safeguarding the gains they have made. There may be a measure
5Ibld . 6 Ibld., p. 303.

14
of truth in this outlook, within recent years there has been
a noticeable relaxation of internal pressures in the Soviet
Union and a partial lifting of the iron curtain which isolated
the population from the rest of the world. ? Harry and Bonaro
Overs treet take an opposite view:
Many persons in the West have hoped that as the
Soviet Union built up that "stronpr material base"
to which it has aspired, it would become more
Interested in the practicalities of a going order
than in Communist expansion. . . . The record does
not support this hope. The Soviet people, we can
assume, would be ready to drop the world revolution
at any time. It. wss never of their devising. But
the Soviet people do not make the Soviet policy.
The Communist Party does that.
5
Mr. Kennedy says, "There is no evidence . . . that Mr. Khrush-
chev has been deterred in the slightest from his objective of
overcoming in every way short of world war what he called the
'senile capitalist system. '"^ Confirming this attitude is
the evidence that rapidly grrowino; economic and military power
of the Communists have given Its leaders added confidence in
their ability to surpass American economic, technological, and
industrial achievements within the next twenty years.
7Ibid., p. 304.
8
Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, The v:ar Called Peace
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1961), cf. p. 15.
9John F. Kennedy, pp.. clt. , p. 9.
10




It is an integral part of Communist doctrine that
military power, while indispensable, should be resorted to
only when and if political and economic weapons have failed,
or when and if military operations promise easy, quick success.
This is expressed quite aptly by (J. F. Hudson who writes,
"Churchill once remarked, that the rulers of Russia do not
want war, they want the fruits of war.' This does not mean
they will not, In the future as in the past, make the utmost
use of nuclear power as a threat. So great is now the military
power of the Soviet Union that the threat of nuclear attack,
freely used as blackmail, will most assuredly become an
instrument of Soviet policy, 12 Certainly the threat of
Russian rocket attacks against British and French forces in
the Suez affair and against any American forces to be employed
in Cuba points up these methods. Robert Strausz Hupe points
out:
Whatever the pace and intensity of Soviet strategies
in a given period Soviet objectives remain the same.
They are, in the short run: First, to force the
withdrawal of the West from its strategic footholds,
especially from the SAC network of bases: second,
to compel the West to direct vital economic and
military resources from Europe: third, to take
western pressure and attention off Eastern EuroDe;
and fourth to exacerbate the divergencies within
the Atlantic Alliance.
^
1:LKarry and Bonaro Overstreet, op. clt .. p. 5.
12--
rhe American Assembly, op. cit
. . p. 305.
^Robert Strauss Hupe, "The Protracted Conflict,"
American.Strategy for the Nuclear Age, ed. Walter F. Hahn,
John C. Neff (New" York: "Doubleday & Co. Inc., i960), p. 27.

16
Protracted conflict appears to be the obvious answer. A
strategy of indirect threats or in which no one single move
constitutes adequate provocation for committing SAC's deterrent
force.^ Robert Straus z Hupe says the success of this program
is hinged directly on our fears that any introduction of such
weapons would surely produce a chain reaction. ->
Under these circumstances it is a matter of life and
death for the United States and other nations of the free world
to maintain their defenses at the highest state of efficiency:
If it is so very important to Russia that the West
be a house divided against itself, E. B. White points
out, then it should be equally important to the free
nations that they stand together, not simply as old
friends who have a common interest but as a oroing
political concern. 16
The united states cannot afford to relax its efforts to maintain
and perfect both nuclear and conventional forces of sufficient
strength to deter the Coramunibt powers from a surprise attack
or from military aggression, even with conventional weapons or
on a limited scale.
Peoples Republic of China
It is difficult to evaluate the weight of Chinese
Communist military power as a component of the total Communist
strength. With a population of over 600 million, the Peoples
Republic has an unsurpassed manpower potential along with an
industrialization factor that confirms they are able to provide
l4 Ibid., p. 107. 15I£M*





modern armament for a huge conventional army.*7 With this
army they are already exerting great pressure on neighboring
states such at Bursa, Horth Viet raja etc. " crucial point
will be reached when the Chinese Communist regime comes into
noseeesion of nuclear weapons, which may be at any time
within the next five years.'1 -1 '
look at the Communist high-potentate is appropriate
as part of the overall Soviet role. President Kennedy has
classified him J
r- brush chev It r>o fool— aBrfl the American people
row '•'now that beyond a doubt. Ke is shrewd, he
is tough, he is vigorous, well informed and confident.
... He rss not putting on ary feet*-he was not
engaging in any idle boasts—when he talked of the
inevitable triumph of tne Communist system, of their
eventual superiority in production, education,
scientific achievement, and world influence. **
Anne M. Jones credits Krushchev's accomplishments as follows:
First, he has placed increasing emphasis on attempts
to strengthen Communist capabilities for relatively
"bloodless" world revolution. Second, he has adapted
military-force structure to nuclear realities—an
attempt to prepare Communist forces for world revo-
lution through conquest if neeesea.ry.2C
ry and Bonero Overs tree t have (One one step further and
credited Khrushchev with twisting the framework of "peaceful
coexistence" to specific ao vantage of the Soviets;
By lowering tensions he has tried to make room for
a free play of mutual susoicious, irritations, and
1 7
'The American Assembly, op. cjt . , p. 306.
18 Ibid. 19John F. Kennedy, loc. clt .
20
Anne M. Jones, 'Changes in Soviet Conflict Doctrine,"
American Ctra.tegy for the Nuclear Age , ed. Walter F. Hahn,
John C. Keff (New York; Doubleday & Co. Inc., I960), p. 152.

18
rivalries within NATO. Again in September
I960, he tried to split the United xNiations Into
colonial and anticolonial blocs. 21
Actually "peaceful coexistence" as devised by the Communists
call for periods of advance alternating with periods of
equilibrium, during which one had to make concessions to the
enemy. These "compromises", however, should never be allowed
to weaken the basic Communist determination to win the life
and death struggle. War between the Soviet Union and its
enemies is considered "inevitable" only if the enemies choose
to resist. 22
Khrushchev is playing for keeps. He has left no room
for doubt on this score. Moreover, his current tactics serve
notice that his drive for power will be urgently stepped up In
the period ahead. His attempted grab in the Congo and his
assault on the United Nations have about them a now-or-never
quality which give the impression that time is of great
importance in Khrushchev's master-plan.
In brief, there are many forces at work in the Soviet
Union which can complicate the life of Soviet policy makers and
Party leader*. None of these forces, however, seem powerful
enough to pose a serious challenge to the Soviet regime. Barring
war or other unforeseen developments, the regime's iron grip
21Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, op. cit.
. p. 27.
22.
"Gerhart Nemeyer, "The Ideological Core of Communism,"
American strategy for the Nuclear Ape , ed. Y«alter F. Hahn, John
C. Neff (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., I960), p. 63.

19
over Soviet society Is not likely to loosen. 2^
The Future
Communism thrives on conflict and tension. "Were it
not for these tensions which the Communists create deliberately
at the very time that they protest a desire to alleviate them,
I suspect communism would collapse of its own dead weight. "24
We must continue to expect tensions since the very survival of
the Communist system depends on their maintenance. The Free-
World should expect the Soviets to continue along this same
pattern and attempt to devise methods to eradicate these
Russian projections.
The great question is whether the United States can,
concurrently, act decisively to meet the succession of threats
and challenges from the Communist bloc as they arise. Although
the past few years have seen many Communist gains, as well as
some setbacks, the firm stand taken by the Free-World serves
notice to Khrushchev he is treading on thin Ice. ,! If the Free-
World can make a clear appraisal of itself and of what a
communist world victory would mean, the balance of power may
23
Vladimir Petrov, "Whither Soviet Evolution,"
American Strategy for the i\iuclear Age , ed. 'Walter F. Hahn,
John C. Neff (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., I960), p. 81.
24
Paul C. McGrath, Defense in the Muclear Era .
A briefing presented by the Deputy Director of Intelligence
and National Security Affairs, Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization, Washington, D. C, February 21, 1961, p. 2.

20
just as decisively shift against Khrushchev. " 25
Threat and Counter-Threat
Deterrent
The American military deterrent force represents a
powerful and highly effective combination or mix of several
services and military weapons. Included are operational
missiles of all kinds, thousands of Jet aircraft, a large fleet
of aircraft carriers, nuclear powered submarines and ground
force units of the Army and Marine Corps trained in the combat
use of tactical nuclear weapons.
A Comparison
The Soviet armed foroes have likewise developed a
powerful nuclear capability. Today, the Soviet military
establishment can fight an unlimited nuclear war or a limited
nuclear war or a non-nuclear war. r-° The Soviet s greatest
advantage is in land power and with more than 12 divisions to
every one of ours, their lead is far greater on land than in
the missile race. 2? There is no doubt in the numbers of
military manpower. All of NATO possesses 21 divisions: The
Soviet Union has 175 divisions— 2.5 million men. 28
With regard to long range missiles, there is a
25Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, op. cit., p. 319.
26 T , tJ - 27 -^<-Ibid . , p. 5. lbia .
28
John F. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 194.

21
considerable controversy. Dr. Paul C. McG-rath, Deputy-
Director of Intelligence, Office of Civil and Defense Mobiliza-
tion (OCDM) sums it up as follows:
The Soviet Union may lead in the development of ICBM
but not by very much. The United States and probably
the Soviet Union have ft small number of ICBM'b in
operational readiness already. . . . The United States
plans to continue increasing its nuclear retaliatory
inventory of liquid-fueled ICBM's to fl total of 270
operational Atlas and Titan is s lies by 1963* All
of the Titans and about 60 of the ktl?B missiles will
be in hardened underground sites. . . . The minuteman
will have the advantage of mobility. . . . The United
States Is exnected to construct several hundred Minuteman
ICBvl's. . . ~. While the United States and the USSR
probably are approximately equal today in terms of
numbers of operational intercontinental missiles, it
is widely believed that the Soviets nlan to produce
more of these early liquid-fueled missiles than does
the United States. ... In the military field, the
Soviet's slight advantage, if any, in the production
of very long-range ballistic weapons is compensated
for by other elements of United States nuclear power.
Whatever advantage the Soviets may have had in long-
range rockets never has been an absolute one. For
example, the United States has many operational
ballistic missiles of 1500 mile range, and about
60 of these intermediate range ballistic missiles
with nuclear capabilities are deployed at bases in
the European area within range of the Soviet Bloc
Soviet intermediated range missiles of course could
not reach targets in the United States, except for
Alaska. 29
In addition to the fixed missile sites, growing In numbers and
in hardness from I960 through 1965 and beyond, the Soviets will
be challenged by the first nuclear submarines armed with the
Polaris missile.-' It is estimated by 1963 that Minutemen
mounted on moving railway cars and missiles to be launched from
29paul C. McGrath, op. cit.
, px>. 6-8.
"50
Non-Military Defense, 'Wisconsin;— A Case Study , ed.
William K. Chipman "[proceedings f a Conference at The Wiscon-




aircraft will be operational.^1
President Kennedy in his book, Strategy of Peace
did not fully agree with Dr. McGrath's late estimates. ^2
However, based on a time differential of one year, It is
questionable whether the following opinion still prevails.
President Kennedy's estimates in I960 were:
We Pre rapidly approaching* that dangerous period
which General Gavin and others have called the
'Van" or the "miss lie-lag period", in the words
of General Gavin, "in which our own offensive and
defensive missile capabilities will lag so far
behind those of the Soviets as to place us in a
position of great peril." The most critical
years of the gap would appear to be in 1960-1964.
"
The defense Oepartiaent'e interpretation of the missile
data was presented to the appropriate Congressional Committees
early in I960 by Seoretary of Defense Gates. He said:
If we compare the estimated Soviet ICBM and sea-
launched missile programs with plans for deployment
of united States IGBM's and Polaris missiles, we
note that the Soviets may enjoy at times a moderate
numerical superiority during the .next 3 years. This
difference in numbers appears to peak during the
1962 period. Our estimates indicate that both
before and after mid -1962 the numbers are closer
together. 34
International Dangers
It is recognized that there are many situations that
31 Ibid .
"52y John P. Kennedy, loc. cit . . p. 194 cf.
33 Ibid ., p. 34.
^Henry F. Glass, Address Before the Conference on
the Soviet Union* Western Michigan Univ., Kalamazoo, Michigan,
March 21, I960, p. 24.
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can cause nuclear conflict—both pressedits ted and unpremedi-
tated. We realize the possibilities of war by inadvertance,
the celling of bluff, the sudden spreading of a limited
war. 35 All too familiar are the miscalculations of Korea
—
both Soviet and United States—our near intervention at
Dienbienphu in 1954, and the Soviet threat of rocket war in
the Suez invasion of 1956. President Kennedy says, "Let no
one think, therefore, that a Soviet attack, inadvertent or
otherwise, is impossible, because of the H-bomb damage which
we would still hope to rain upon the Soviets. "^6 A8 an
example of the terror we face, consider this authentic report
outlined by a national magazine.
It reported event n which took place in December of
I960 when th" most powerful radar system ever
built and manned by United States defense forces
inadvertently reported as 9?. 9 percent certain''
that a ballistic missile attack had been launched
against the ilorth American continent. 3?
Herman Khan an accepted authoritarian en Soviet oolicy hss
presented in his recent book an objective analysis of the 5
possible ways nuclear war can take place:
1. I Soviet attack "out of the blue."
2. An ''Accidental" accident.
3. An ultimatum issued by the United States which
was unacceptable to the USSR and from which we
refused to back down.
4. A reversal of the above national positions.
5* A "non-accidental" accidental war arising from
35John F. Kennedy, op, cit. t p. 37.
57John a. Hubbell, "You Are Under Attack," The Readers
Digest , April, 1961, p. 37.
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either 3 or 4 above. 58
Estimate of Soviet Intentions
The probability of anyone predicting with any degree
of reliability Soviet intentions are about as positive as
winning a contest in a game of "Russian Roulette."
Clearly, the question of whether or not the USSR
will initiate war—and, if so, what type of war
and when— cannot be answered by considering any
single factor or set of factors. Existing weapons
systems permit Khrushchev a broad freedom of choice
whether nuclear, conventional or limited, and he
himself has predicted new and advanced weapons for
his arsenal. 39
Basically, Soviet attack is possible, though of course by no
means assured. Despite the defensive and offensive strengths
of the USSR there are many good reasons why the Soviet rulers
would not wish to embark upon the pursuit of courses of action
designed to lead to general war with the United States. Dr.
McGrath is of the opinion:
In the foreseeable future it would seem to be
beyond Russian capability to destroy enough of
our world-wide offensive power in one blow to
make the risks of an all-out surprise nuclear
attack acceptable to the Soviet ruling class. 40
It can be predicted that the problem of surprise
attack will become increasingly difficult for the Soviets as
"58
Herman Khan, On Thermonuclear War . Summary by
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, ?AC Paper, No. 114,
January 27, 1961, p. 10.
^Anne M. Jones, "Changes in Soviet Conflict Doctrine,"
American Strategy for the Nuclear Age
, ed. Walter F. Hahn,
John C. Keff (New York: Doubleday ana Co. Inc., I960),
p. 162.
^°Paul C. McGrath, op. clt ., p. 16.
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each new long-range missile is added to the United States
inventory. Other authorities, including the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirm
the above ooinion. They are in general agreement that the
likelihood of enemy attack will decline as we obtain
submarines armed with Polaris missiles in 1961, finish work
on our hard cites for ICBM's and place Minuteroen in an
operational status in 1963. ^
Nuclear Weapons Effects
q&neral
To make a proper evaluation of the overall threat, it
is necessary to consider the nature of the threat.
The basic effect of a nuclear detonation is the very
rapid release of enormous amounts of energy in a very limited
space. The total energy depends on the size and nature of the
weapon and may be the equivalent of exploding 20 million tons
of TNT. 2 This violent energy release takes several forms,
mainly, heat, blast effect and nuclear radiation. Although the
effects of heat and blast produce devastation and death in
the immediate area of the nuclear explosion, the hideous
feature of this weapon is the wide area of fatalities and
injuries that radiation burns will produce on victims many
^•Non-Military Defense
f
Wisconsin:—A Case Study ,
op. cit . t p. 13.
42Committee on Fallout Protection, Survival in a
Nuclear Attack . A report to Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller,
State of New York, Feb. 15, I960, p. 24.
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miles distant from the location of the explosion.
Heat Effects
The effect of heat though deadly in the immediate area
rapidly lowers in intensity depending on the distance from
the fireball. The initial heat effect is of relatively short
duration but is so intense that it can ignite combustile
materials and inflict second degree burns more than 25 miles
away. -" The thermal radiation or heat emitted within a few
seconds by a five megaton surface burst may produce third
degree burns, charring, out to nine miles from the point of
explosion, and second degree burns, that is, burns with blist-
ers, can occur within 11 miles, covering an area of about 380
square miles. ^ With an air burst it Is expected that
personnel would receive third degree burns out to 15 miles
and second degree burns out to 17 miles. 5
Blast Effects
The blast effect is also of a momentary nature, but
can be so powerful as to completely collapse conventional
building structures at distances up to ten miles and cause
substantial damage up to 25 miles. ° A high pressure wave
43Ibid.
^John A. McGone, "Effects of Nuclear Weapons and the
Nature of the Fallout Hazard/' White House Conference on
Fallout Protection
. Jan. 25, 1960, p. 12.
" Ibid .
46Committee on Fallout Protection, loc. clt.
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proceeds at about the speed of sound in all directions from
the fireball. For a five megaton buret, the blast will
destroy typical homes out to about five miles from ground
zero and seriously damage them to 10 miles.^ As a result of
the pulverizing effects of the blast and the intense heat
produced, a surface-burst weapon digs a huge crater and
vaporizes large amounts of the displaced soil, rock and other
material. For a distance of several crater radii beyond the
edge of the crater, there is a region of complete and unrecog-
nizable destruction. In the case of a large thermonuclear
U T) weapon, this can amount to 5000 feet from the point of
burst. Ko protection can be provided within this area, except
for very deep underground shelters. °
Radiation Effects
The nuclear radiation is of two kinds. There is an
intense momentary release of prompt radiation at the time of
detonation. This is quickly dissipated and can cause
substantial casualties only in the area which is also
devastated by blast and heat. This is called initial or
prompt radiation; it effects a limited area out to less than
three miles from ground zero and for convenience is described
as the radiation occurring within one minute after the
explosion. ^9
47
'John t« He Cone, loc. clt .
48
U. S. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, The
rffects of Euclear Weapons, June 1957, pp. 18-41.
40^John A. McCone, op. clt ., p. 12.
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Residual radiation is the deadly type of radiation
that can take millions of casualties many miles away from the
detonation. This is commonly termed fallout. Residual
radiation resulting from the continuing radioactivity of the
several hundred fission products of the detonation, remains
for days and weeks and longer. 5° When a nuclear explosion
takes place at or near the surface of the earth, the intense
heat of the fireball vaporizes large quantities of the earth
or other material directly below.
Detonated on the surface, a five megaton, 50 percent
fission bomb will produce large crater drawing up tens of
thousands of tons of earth and mixing it with the radioactive
fission products of the bomb, which at the moment of explosion
are equal in radioactivity to slightly over 250 million tons
of radium.
5
1 This mixture of earth particles and fission
products is widely distributed by the winds through which it
falls.
Fallout
The heavier and larger pieces, including a great deal
of contaminated material scoured ana" thrown out of the crater,
will not be carried upward into the mushroom cloud but will
descend directly and form a roughly circular pattern around
ground zero. JC The smaller particles, however, are carried




52Glen S. Waterman, An Effec tive Shelter Program . Thes-
is No. 136 for Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
Washington, D. C, April 30, 1959. p. 13.
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upward to a height of several miles and may spread out before
they fall downwind in a leaf shaped patten, of contamination. 53
The shape, dimensions, and intensities of the fallout pattern
are dependent upon many factors. Included ere weather,
topography, type and yield of weapon, height of burst, wind
velocities and other related factors. 5^
This is the fallout from which v* must be protected.
It is deposited on the ground, roofs and other surfaces,
sometimes like a light fell of snow. It can fall relatively
evenly or it can drift under the influence of winds and air
currents. For example, if the enemy should decide to attack
selected industry, government and population centers as well,
soon after the first attacks on military objectives, the fall-
out contamination might blanket large areas of the nation,
including the densely populate! Northeast." OCDM exercises
and other studies have demonstrated that virtually the entire
land area of the United States would be endangered by fallout
in the event of even a modest-scale nuclear attack. 5°
if it is sufficient in quantity to bs dangerous it is
likely that it can be seen both as a dust cloud in the air
and as a coating on surfaces. The Committee on Fallout
53 lb id
., p. 14.








op. c lt.. p. 19.
" U. S. Congress, Committee on Government, Civil
Defense; Twenty-First Intermediate Report, 86th Cong., 2d Sees.
(VJashinfeton, D. C. , Report Ho. 2069, i960), p. 15.
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Protect ion of New York state has established one hour as a
noint of critical time.
'There Is i considerable interval between the
initial burst of the weapon »nd the arrival of
fallout at locations far enough sway where there
are likely to be any large number of survivors.
This time will vary from about one hour for the
cloeer-in survivor locations uu to 8 to 10 hours
or more for the more distant locations. Those
intervals represent the time it takes for the
material to rise in the mushroom cloud, cool off
and then in significant amounts gradually sift
down to esrth.58
Fallout DangerAw—Mi i |^ — m*tmm *—•*» ww*~*»*«m*m~**—
This fallout is dangerous because It is intensely
radioactive. It radiates, alpha, bets* ^nd gamma type ener
of which alpha and beta is harmful only on direct contact vith
the skin. It is the X-ray gamma radiation emitted by fallout
that can cause widespread death and injury unless people ->re
protected against it. The immediate survival action required
of individuals not injured by explosion effects would consist
of getting behind one to three feet of earth or the equivalent,
es in a sand-bagged basement corner, to reduce radiation levels
exposures to tolerable levels the first few days when fallout
is most intense. ^9 There is simply no other solution to the
fallout problem in 'hot" zones than to gat behind the shielding
Committee on Fallout Protection, op. cjt., p. 26.
58 Ibid .




provider? by a mass of dense .material. Persons who through
ignorance or through attempting to carry on with emergency
activities remained above ground would, become sick or would
die. This report from the National Academy of Sciences
—
National Research Council is quoted for Its brutal frankness:
Adequate shielding is the only effective means of
preventing radiation casualties. Medical prophylactic
and therapeutic measures to prevent death following
exposure to large doses of radiation do not presently
exist. 60
Radiat ion Measurement
How radiation affects people depends upon a number of
circumstances including intensity, length of exposure, period
of time over which dosage is absorbed, whether the total body
is exposed, i (?e, apd general health. Making precise predic-
tions of the effect of n cut,e radiation on individuals who may
be in a fallout area is presently impossible. Mr. John A.
McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission has this to say
about it:
Our medical experience in treating acute radiation
sickness depends upon the total dose received and
upon the rate at which it is received. To put it
another tray, the sane amount of radiation which
would make one very sick if he received the do.c e
in two days might not "be Immediately disabling if
he received the dose e-radu^lly over the course of
a couple of sonths.&L
60
Leo A. Koegh, 'Feasibility of Fallout Shelter and
Relation of Fallout Shelter, White Hou s e o
n
fere n ce on
Fal 1ou t Pro t e c t lor* , January ?c~ !9§o7 o.'TSY"
61
John A. i-icCone, loc. clt .

A substantial dose absorbed over a few daya will do
immediate damage to body tissues by ionization. tiarly sickness
and death will result. Over a period of about two days, for
example, a dose of 200 roentgens (r) may make some people sick
but none should die; a dose of 300r will make most people sick
and some die; a dose of 700 in the same period will kill
almost everyone exposed. The problem which takes orecedence
over all others in protection against fallout is, therefore,
guarding against substantial doses in a short oeriod of time.
As the radiation dose increases from 250 to 800 roentgens
the chances of survival change from a favorable to a very
unfavorable position and no survivors can be expected from
6?doses greater than 1000 roentgens.
People can tolerate, without fatal injury or even
noticeable sickness, substantial dosages of radiation if
spread over long periods. For example, while a dose of 700r
in a few days is fatal, appreciably larger doses can be
tolerated over a period of a year without showing immediate
ill effects. However, any substantial accumul ted dosage,
even over a long period, can be injurious in lifetime effects,
inducing cancerous diseases in later life and generally
shortening the life span. A preliminary report to the House
Committee on Government Operations presented this analysis:
An individual will not become incapacitated or
his ability to work be seriously affected so long
as his acute dose is kept below 200r. If the dose
exceeds 200r over a short period, there will be




If the short-term dose exceeds 600r over a
short period, there will be radiation sickness
requiring; medical attention. If the short-tern?
dose exceeds 600r, almost everyone so exposed will
die. Therefore, in a fallout area, our objective
is to limit the short-term radiation exposure to
less than 200r and thus prevent radiation sickness, °3
The total accumulated dose 19 hours after a surface burst
with ft fission yield in the megaton range might run to lOOOr
or more in an area roughly 20 mil A s across at the widest place
and 100 miles Ion?", nearly the distance from Washington to
Philadelphia. 64 Closer to the point of detonation the accumu-
lated dose would be higher. Such a radiation dose of lOOOr
or more received within a period of 18 hours would prove fatal
to all unprotected persons within one to three weeks. »
While early radioactivity following* a nuclear detona-
tion is extremely high, this intensity immediately begins to
decline rapidly due to the natural process of decay of the
radioactive fission products. The rapid rate of decline in
radioactivity proceeds at a pace that reduces the intensity
level to a point where a 3000r per hour intensity one hour
after blast would decline to 300r oer hour after seven hours,
to 30r per hour after two days and to 3r per hour pfter two
weeks. 66
6'5
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense : Hearings, 86th Con?., 2d Sess.,
I960, p. 6.
64
John A. McCone, op. clt . , p. 13.
^Ibid.




Radiation easily penetrates ordinary materials such
as clothing or the walls of an average frame house. However,
by interposing a sufficient mass and weight of any kind of
material between the fallout and a person, the intensity can
be reduced to a level that is tolerable. For example, a
concrete shelter in a basement, a heavier concrete enclosure
in a completely exposed location above ground, or a covering
of earth over a shelter can reduce the intensity by a ratio
of 100 to 1 or more. "
Thus there are three means of reducing the intensity
of the radiation—time, distance and shielding. By taking
advantage of their reducing effects, and combinations of them
and by getting into a shelter before fallout arrives, people
oao be protected against death or serious injury. The vital
time for protection is the first few days and of that the first
hours are crucial. After a few days the problems of living
with radiation are fairly easy
—
provided that early protection
has prevented a substantial dosage.
Vulnerability of the United States
General
The first big question that must be raised about non-
military defense 1b whether oeoole can in fact be protected
from modern nuclear weapons. Protection involves not only
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fallout effects, it includes the provisioning of food, water
and medicants, besides the basic requirements for long-term
habitation and sanitation. Arrangements for getting people
into the shelters in response to different warnings will be a
major consideration. There have been many studies conducted
and expert opinions voiced concerning the value of shelter
protection. It is believed appropriate that a cross section
of these selected ideas should be examined in order that an
objective approach can be taken:
he nand Study says there appears to be a number of
possibilities for protective eye terns, and under
plausible assumptions about the enemy attack and
the civilian response, significant, *nd in some
cases dramatic reductions in civilian casualties
appear to be obtainable. 69
I r. Janae H. Douglas, former Deputy Secretary of
Defense, is of the opinion that if, despite our
earnest efforts at the negotiating table and our
defense preparations, we should nevertheless be
subjected to nuclear attack, civil defense and
measures for fallout protection offer the most
practicable and feasible means of saving the
greatest number of lives. 70
Ma j Gen. John Ke&aris on the other hand believes
the concept of mass evacuation of high-aensity
population centers and the burial of our citizenry
in deep shelters would negate any kind of positive
reaction to attack. 71
Mr, Rogers Cannell says, "Studies of many possible
attacks indicate that a program providing good blast
^The Rand Corporation, Feport on a Study of Nod-
Kllita ry Defense . 1959, p. 5.
'°James H. Douglas, "Mature of Threat and Importance
of Civil Defense,'' White House Conference on Fallout Protec-
tion , January 25, 1*T£0, pi" 7*
71John B. Madarie. Countdow n for Decision (New York.
G. P. Putnam's Sons, I960), p. 25!Tcf.
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shelter? 1b urban areas plus fallout shelters in
the rest of the nation could hold total casualties
to less than jp percent of the popv"' ation. "72
G-oneral Laaiay when questioned by the House Comiaittee
investigating civil defense Indiested that he would
. put a tremendous Rffiount of monev into holes in
the ground to crawl into, that he would rather spend
more of it on offensive weapons systems to deter the
vsr in the first place. 73
Governor Hoegh vhen questioned by Chairman Kolifield
was emphatic in his opinion that la the event of
nuclear attack on this country, fallout shelters
offer the bert single non-military defense measure
for the protection of the greatest number of the
people. 7*
It should be staged 1n the beginning that 1t in not believed
rr-> son" blc to assume that reliable protection for all the
population can be provided and the fraction of the population
that can gain effective pretention will depend on the uncertain
nature of the enemy attack.
Casualty Estimates
It appears the belief that civil-defense is hopeless in
the era of hydrogen weapons and intercontinental missiles is
not true. Based on the Wisconsin Study, if the country
undertakes a relatively irodest program of civil-defense, there
are prood hones of savinsr the lives of a crest portion of the
national population, of holding deathe to some 30 trillion,
72
Foyers Cannell, "The Strategic Role of Civil
Defense,'' American Strategy for the Nuclear Age (;New York:
Doubleday ft Co. "Inc. , T96O) ,"pT 329.
73
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defens e; Hearings, op. cit ., p. 157.
74Teo A. Foegh, op. cit .. p. 8.
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one-sixth of the total population, and of not being condemned
to live forever in hopeless poverty. 75 Senator Young is not
quite so optimistic. He says,
The fact remains that the most optimistic estimate
of the devastation of nuclear attack, despite a
network of shelters, places probable death at
fifty million Americans with some twenty million
others sustaining injuries. 76
Mr. Morgenstern takes a philosophical viewpoint.
While we can show that shelters are no guarantee
against loss of life, they do offer a great deal
and are—apart from avoiding attack altogether
—
the only chance of saving people by the tens of
millions. It is paradoxical; on the one hand we
know that tens of millions will certainly be lost,
no matter what we do; but on the other hand tens of
millions who would surely also perish can be saved.
Are the latter worth a great effort? or is the
disaster of the loss of the others so erreat and
unthinkable that it is not possible to conceive
of an effort to preserve the lives of some?77
Rand Study Interpretatio n
The Rand Study of Non-Military Defense is believed
to be one of the most authentic, reliable and latest studies
that have been made public. The 168 standard metropolitan
areas of the United States were regarded as target areas or
the most probable targets for attack. Standard metropolitan
areas containing a high concentration of industry and people
are designated as critical target areas. These 70 critical
7RNon-Mil Itary Defense, Wisconsin;—A Case Study
.
op. cit .. p. 18.
76
Stephen M. Young, "Civil Defense; Billion Dollar
Boondoggle," The Progressive
. December I960, p. 19.
••Askar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense
(New York: Random House, 1959), P« 115.

target areas were assumed to be the most probable enemy
objectives, based on the estimate the return per bomb in damage
and casualties would be greatest there and each of the 92
principal cities in the target areas would be struck by at
least one bomb of appropriate yield. 7° it was likewise assumed
that the daytime centers of population would be the aiming
points within each city, since these centers coincide generally
with centers of industrial concentration.
Casualty calculations
A rough measure of the possible effectiveness of
certain shelter systems is provided by some calculations of
copulation casualties. Two possible shelter systems were
considered: a system of fallout shelters only and a system of
heavy, medium, and light shelters designed to provide both
blast and fallout protection for the entire population.
Two hypothetical levels of enemy attack were considered.
The first level was defined as the delivery on target of suffi-
cient weapons to destroy all buildings in the 50 largest
urbanized areas.
The casualty results from this attack measured from
a high of 90 million deaths to a low of 30 million.
The 90 million was based on no non-military defense
measures while the 30 million was based on a system
of fallout protection plus a substantial tactical
evacuation. Estimates in between these two figures
varied as the amount of fallout protection increased
and the ease of evacuation occurred. Finally, if the
attack occurred after strategic evacuation, casualties
might be held down to 5 million to 25 million people. 79
(See Table 1).
'
8The Rand Corporation, op. cit





CALCULATED PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATE SHELTER
\mm various Arr cks
(Milliem of u. 8. fatalities Out of 180
million population)
50-City attack
Non-Military Defense system 30 to 60 3 to 6




No non-military defense measures 90 90
System of fallout shelters plus
arrangements for tactical evacua-
tion 70 30
Same, after strategic evacuation 25 5
The second level attack involved the 150-city attack.
With no non-military defense measures a comnletely
effective 15-clty attack could result in 160 million
deaths in the United States. With a system of fallout
shelters, and given several hours warning for evacuation,
casualties might be reduced to 60 million. With a
complete system of blrjst-and-fallout shelters, and
even with only 30 to 60 minutes of warning, casualties
might be held to 25 million. Less warning would,
of course, increase the casualties if only a, system
of fallout shelters were provided, while prior strategic
evacuation would result in still fewer casualties with
eitiier system. cO (See Table 2).
A further word should be said about these hypothetical
attacks. Even if an enemy had the initial capability to
completely destroy 50 or 150 large cities, it is not certain
that he would do so in actual war. Successful accomplishment












No non-military defense measures
System of fallout shelter plus
arrangements for tactical
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of United States air defenses might so reduce the enemy's
forces that he would not be able to take out so many cities. 81
Or the war might start in one of the less premeditated ways
mentioned earlier, so that the enemy's strikes would be small
and uncoordinated.
Although this thesis is directed toward the personnel
aspects of shelter protection it would not be complete without
a consideration of the structural damage.
Heavy attacks would of course further reduce the
industrial capital that might survive for postwar





bottlenecks might limit effective use of that
which did survive. A 150- city attack would raise
the level of destruction from about 55 percent of
United States manufacturing capital to around 70
percent. Though part of United States capital
would survive even the hypothetical area attack,
it seems clear that some means of preserving a
larger fraction would be needed to face postwar
recuperation with any real hope.^ 2
It is apparent from the above that a system of fallout
shelters might save tens of millions of lives in either a
50-city of a 150-city attack. A complete system of blast-and-
fallout shelters would, of course, be more effective. In the
case of a 150-city attack, such a system would probably be
needed to hold fatalities below a third of the population. ^3
Both systems would be affected by the amount of warning avail-
able, and sufficient time for tactical evacuation would be
particularly important for effective use of, the fallout
shelters. Prior strategic evacuation, if this were possible,




The next major question that must be examined in
connection with non-military defense is whether the population
can survive the long-term radiation levels resulting from
fallout. There would be little point in sheltering people from
instantaneous blast and short-run fallout effects of a nuclear
attaok if they emerged from their shelters into an atmosphere
82Ibld
. , p. 29. 83 Ibld.
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so radioactive that life could not be sustained.
There is no doubt that the structure of society
would be seriously affected. There would be tens
or scores of millions dead and more millions wounded
or ill: mechanises for production, distribution
and finance would be damaged and destroyed over
large ?reas: and hordes of impoverished refugees
would require food and shelter. But it does not
appear, from study of disasters in human history
from the Black Death through the Russian Civil War
to Hiroshima ind Nagasaki, that it is likely that
the fabric of organized society would break down
under the impact of thermonuclear attack. 84
Long-term radiation appears particularly threatening in the
light of current widespread fears about the consequences of
nuclear testing which releases only a fraction of the radio-
active materials that would be released in an all-out nuclear
war. "'It must be recognized that fallout protection immediately
after the attack must first be adequate to hold radiation below
200 roentgens for the bulk of the population.
Long-Term Fallout Levels
The seriousness of the long-term radiation problem has
been examined with the aid of fallout calculations derived from
hypothetical enemy attacks. They are herein summarized:
1. Based on the probability that fallout would be
unevenly distributed after an attack, there is
raised the possibility of people living and raising
food primarily in the less contaminated areas of the
country.
2. It is estimated the rate of decay of radiation
a week after an attack would be 0.2 percent of the
1-hour rate and after 90 days would be 0.01 percent.
ah^
Non-Military Defense, Wisconsin;— A Case Study
,
op. clt .. p. 11.




3. Countermeasures are possible to reduce the
radiation that people receive. Decontamination,
by washing or sweeping hard surfaces, and by
plowing or scraping earth areas, can reduce residual
radiation to levels l/5 to l/lCO of those prevailing
previously. Shielding buildings with earth or con-
crete can oroduce almost any attenuation desired.
Once a few protected areas are available, radiation
damage can be limited by rationing the number of
hours per day that individuals have to work in a
contaminated environment. 86
In the c-'se of a 50-city attack, tne cumulative lifetime
exposure to external total body radiation (after 90 days with
countermeasures), averaged over the area of the United States,
might be less than 5 roentgens. °? Thus if short-term radia-
tion could be hell below 200 roentgens for the bulk of the
population, the additional long-term problem would be
comparatively small.
Medical Conseouences of Radiation
The consequences of a ohronic lifetime exposure to
radiation are not so clear. There is evidence, however, that
long-term dauage can be assessed largely in terms of decreased
life-span. Analysis and extrapolation of data on radiation
damage to animals suggest that a reasonable though uncertain
estimate of the extent of life-shortening might be something
like 7 years per 1000 roentgens for children, and less for
adults. The Rand Study on genetic effects is summarized
below;
Genetic effects of long-term radiation are even
more difficult to estimate reliably. For each
86 lbid ., p. 17. 87Ibid.
88 Ibid., p. 16.
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50-roentgen exposure of one parent, there may
be an increase of one in a thousand in the number
of harmfully affected offspring as a result of
dominant mutations. Recessive mutations would
only rarely produce serious malformation in
immediate offspring, and their effects in lowered
fertility and vigor would b© spread over many
subsequent generations. Thus 1000 roentgens of
long-term radiation to both parents might increase
the chance of producing a seriously defective child
from 8 percent to perhaps 12 percent. °9
Food Availability and Production
During the reorganization phase, the bulk of the food
and other consumer goods needed to sustain life would have to
come from inventories or from imports rather than from domestic
production. A rough estimate indicates that surviving food
inventories would be sufficient at le*?st for survival.
The government now has a large store of agricultural
products accumulated in price-support operations;
stocks of wheat, corn and other grains on September
30, 1957 were sufficient to supply 2000 calories
per day to 180 million people for more than 1 year.°°
These government stocks are dispersed so ss to be largely
invulnerable to a city attack and are not made unfit for
human consumption by fallout. The government stocks of grain
cited for one year were valued at about v4 billion. *
Turning to the production of food after the reorganiza-
tion phase, it is reasonably clear that a 50- city attack
would no-o be a serious threat to the recuperation of United
States agriculture.
39IPM-
9°Ibid. t p. 24.
91 Ibid., p. 25.
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At present, 320 million to 3^0 million acres of
cropland are harvested annually. But only about
20 percent are used to produce industrial crops
and feed for livestock. Further, the Department
of Agriculture estimates that there are about 200
million acres now in oasture, range and woodland
that could be Improve? and planted to crops. 92
Given the contamination levels after a £0-city attack as
discussed earlier, 9* justments of cropping patterns and land
use should be sufficient to permit safe recuperation of agri-
cultural output to preattack levels. This conclusion ought
to be similar for a 150-city attack.
Industrial Recovery
ore vulnerable than agriculture to nuclear attack is
a nation's industry. Industrial buildings and equipment are
even more concentrated in large cities th?n population. The
50 largest metropolitan areas contain about a third of the
United States population but more than half of the United
States manufacturing capital. 93 Thus it does not seem unrea-
sonable to fear that destruction of the nation's capital might
be so Bevere, and surviving capital might be so out of
balance among Industries, as to keep industrial production
below levels adequate for recuoeration. Table 3 shows the
extent of industrial recovery after a 50- city attack. The
calculation indicates that the status of the economr under a
decade of reconstruction would be more favorable than previously
feared. Thus restoration of the preattack G-rosfi National
Product (GliP) within something like a decade seems a reasonable
92




















Grose National Product 56 89 128
Consumption 58 103 137
Food 77 100 124
Housing 60 95 133
No ndurabies 51 113 135
Durables (New) 86 216
Government 54 72 86
Investment 48 48 150
estimate.
Reorganization Problem
The reorganization phase will be complicated and acute
requiring the best in ingenuity and resources. Without going
into a detailed discussion of these far-reaching problems, it
will be sufficient to say that given reasonable preattack
preparation, these reorganization problems do not appear
insuperable. 94 m particular we should not underestimate the
94Ibid
. , p. 23.
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strength in an emergency of a decentralized private enterprise
economy and of widespread ingenuity among the people.
Accordingly, it has been assumed that extensive reorganization
could be accomplished within a reasonable length of time so
that economic resources that survived could be effectively
used thereafter.
Post Attack Conclusions
A radioactive environment will take its toll. This
fact must not be minimized. But it is also important to know
that its toll is no worse than a setback of only a few decades
in medical history. Mr. Cannell says, "Our lives would be as
long as our grandfathers' and the proportion of stillborn
children and child deformities should be no worse than thirty
years ago. "95 on this basis and with the nresent state of
medical knowledge, the post attack environment would be some-
what safer than the one most of us entered at birth. 56
Despite the many unresolved questions about long-term
fallout, it seems to be a sound generalization that long-term
radiation problems are a less critical threat to the survival
of a population than the central short-term problem, namely,
how to protect a substantial fraction of the population from
the Immediate disaster of a nuclear war.





PROBLEMS OF SHELTER PROTECTION
A formidable amount of evidence has been presented In
the previous chapter that rather conclusively establishes the
position that during and after a nuclear holocaust, many
millions of Americans that would otherwise die can be protected
and saved through the employment of a shelter program.
The question then is immediately asked, if the above
premise is correct, why has not the wealthiest and most power-
ful nation in the world provided for the ultimate safety of
its citizens? It would certainly seem out of national
character, in this country where the individual's rights and
human life are guaranteed by Constitutional decrees, that our
governing authority has allowed this void to exist and widen
In severity.
The problems of shelter protection are putting it
vulgarly a "national bag of worms" that originated with the
possession by the Russians of the atomic bomb in 1950 and has
since expanded in scope with each succeeding technological
development that perfects the military art of human eradication.
The complications of shelter protection are many and range in
scope from an attitude, there is nothing that can be done, to




expenditure of #20 billion to provide shelters.
Within this spectrum are such problems as attack,
warning time, evacuation plane, peoples* attitudes, expenditure
of funds, and many other considerations. It will be necessary
to expand on these major points of conjecture in order that a




In the event of nuclear attack the question of whether
to evacuate, to run for shelter, or to do both will be upper-
most in the minds of many people and especially those in
critical authority.
Evacuation of Cities
Under the guidance of OCDM, most major cities have
prepared evacuation plans for their population to designated
areas where the supposed enemy assessment of favorable target
features has been greatly reduced. The problems Involved In
such a course of action, however, are of considerable magnitude.
Consider just one condition where the international situation
has deteriorated to the point where authorities order the
oities evacuated. To move from their homes, activities, and
employment the millions of people in our standard metropolitan
areas would throw an impossible burden upon the government for
shelter, continuing food supply, water, sanitation and all the
other requirements of minimum normal existence. Suppose the
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enemy desired to maintain these intolerable conditions for an
indefinite period where threat of attack was always persistent
but had not reached the ''no-recall" stage. Such a condition of
alert could exist during long periods of international tension
without actual attack, iissentially, the commercial and
industrial life of the nation would cease.
Then, if one takes the example where the city dwellers
or at least some populations have been sole to effect an
evacuation before their cities are leveled by nuclear bombs,
it is admitted that many millions will be saved from the
effects of blast. But how many will be caught out in the open
trying to make an escape, and how many will die from the short-
term radiation because essentially there *re no shelters to
evacuate to? Take the reaction to the proposal and plan by
OCDM to evacuate the populace of Washington, 0. C. to Virginia.
The statement receive! by the subcommittee from the Virginia
State civil-defense coordinator is typical of many replies in
this respect. It states:
The Commonwealth of Virginia h^s never felt that
it would be feasible to consider the evacuation-
reception centers because congregated facilities
of magnitude that would house a large number of
evacuees at rural Virginia do not exist. Therefore,
the State in planning for its obligation to receive
evacuees from Washington, D. C. and other target
areas, has proposed to house these persons in homes.
If the homes in the reception areas would have a
2-week food supply we believe that the chance of
survival is greater in decentralizing the evacuees
to manageable groups Into homes where food supplies
exist.
1
U. £. Congress, House, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Civil Defense ; Twenty-First Intermediate Report, 86th
Cong., 2d £ess. Washington, D. C, Report No. 2069, I960, p. 18.
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Only in a few spotty instances have the States and target areas
been able to report fully prepared and provisional evacuation
centers in being. In most cases, reception centers merely
have been designated without further preparation. The action
of OCBM in distributing and ©repositioning its 200-bed
emergency-hospital packages seems to be the extent of the
oreoaratlon for evacuation reception centers. In this regard
the Committee on Government Operations conducting hearings on
civil-defense is of the opinion that even if the homes in the
designated reception areas are opened up to evacuees from
target cities, the shielding afforded by those residential
structures would be of limited value in providing protection
from radioactive fallout. ?
Rational Policy on Evacuation
Governor Hoegh indicates the National Policy on evacua-
tion is one which is constantly misunderstood or misrepresented.
The National Plan outlines the evacuation policy in this
manner:
Governments and the public will tafee such action on
receipt of warning as is prescribed by the Government
involved:
i. .vacation or Dispersal—target cities and other
areas near assumed targets will, 11 time and conditions
permit, execute plans for evacuation or dispersal to
prepared reception areas.
3. Shelter— If time and conditions do not permit
evacuation, full advantage will be taken of existing





3. The action to be taken is a local decision.'
When questioned by the subcommittee at to the present policy
of OCDM with respect to evacuation and shelter, Gov. Koegh
reported that OCDto is recommending both evacuation and shelter.
Trie decision to follow one or the other or a combination of
the two if one which must be made by each loc-il community,
under current OCDM planning. Cfovernor Hoegh noted that the
ffayor of a local community is the leader of the people of that
community and described the local mayor's function as follows:
When he gets the information that there is going to
be an attach upon his city, he has to make the
decision, with the advice of a good staff, as to
whether or not there la p-jfficient tift4 to move his
oeople away from the horror and the hell of blasts
or whether or not they should take er.^
On the other side of the coin, Governor Koegh admitted that
there are few, if any, reception centers or areas prepared to
the extent of having personnel assigned on a permanent basis
v;ith equipment and supplies prepositiooed, and shelter provided
against radiation. He said, "we are not sure our level of
preparedness would ever reach this stage in view of the cost
that would be Involved, as well as the Impracticality of
retting ftaide large amounts of resources."-'
Rand Study on "iarnlng and '-'.ovejr.ent
Important work has been done by the Rand Corporation
^Leo A. Koegh, "Feasibility of Fallout Shelter and
Relation of Fallout Shelter," hite House Conference on Fallout
Protection
. Jan. 25, I960, p. 20.
4 Ibid




in considering the problems of evacuation. They conclude that
warning measured in terms of days is possible if a nuclear
attack occurs as an extension of a local war, or after a
period of severe international tension, or as a last resort
decision by the United States," Movement of a significant
portion of the city population into emergency quarters in
small towns and rural areas would then be possible. The prime
historical example is the evacuation of children and mothers
from London and other English cities in 1939 which reduced
London's population by 25 to 35 percent by the time war was
declared.
'
Warning measured in hours is crucially dependent on
the tactics chosen by the enemy. Directly dependent in this
regard are those cities spared by the holocaust of the initial
attack wave permitting them several hours of warning. Initial
investigation suggests that in most cities, particularly the
medium and small cities most likely to survive the first wave,
an organized tactical evacuation could be carried out within
3 to 6 hours. The objective would be to move the bulk of the
city population out to a shelter belt extending 20 to 50 miles
from the center.
°
Warning measured in terms of minutes is likely to be
all that would be available for cities that the enemy chose to
6 The Rand Corporation, Report on a Study of Non-
Military Defense . 1958, p. 8,
Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 9.
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attack in his first wave, or possibly with a following salvo
of ICBM's. Even in this case it appears to be technically
feasible to design heavy shelters into which the bulk of the
population could conceivably duck in 30 to 60 minutes—or a
smaller fraction of the population if less time were
available."
It should be stressed at this point that the tactics
chosen by an attacker, and hence the amounts of warning
available to various cities, are very much a funotlon of the
posture of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the effective-
ness of United States air defenses. Unless SAC is so sheltered
and defended that an enemy would have to concentrate nearly
all of his first strike on attempting to destroy SAC's
capacity to retaliate, warning sufficient for tactical evacua-
tion or even for ducking into "heavy" shelters might not be
available for many cities.
Evacuate or Take Cover
Many people have strong opinions on whether evacuation
is considered to be a wise policy. OCDM has been many times
criticized for promulgating what has been considered as an
undefined, hazy, and hopelessly confused set of instructions







The Increase In protest and comedy concerning the
six previous national Civil Defense drills reflected
a swelling, inner grumbling within the nation, »
growing feeling that whether or not Civil Defense
makes sense in theory, the Civil Defense we have
in practice makes none. ... In the first place,
the goals of our Civil Defense plenners are hidden
by confusion. The average American is not quite
sure whether he is expected to hide in his basement
or run from his house, and neither is the OCDM.H
Mr. Morgenstern in his views on evacuation says:
Evacuation is useless, even where possible, and for
the most part it is nuite unthinkable. It is nonsense.
In the present fall-out, world of high-speed planes,
and missiles, a successful and meaningful evacuation
of large cities is entirely out of the question. 12
One of the ardent foes of OCDM and a confirmed non-supporter
of the shelter program, Senator Stephen M. Young has this
opinion:
The truth is the theory of evacuation in this missile
age is not only silly but dangerous. Fnemy submarines
off our coasts could hurl rockets with nuclear warheads
as much as 1500 miles inland with accuracy. We would
be lucky to have three minutes warning. . . • ICBM's
fired from within the Soviet Union would take fifteen
to eighteen minutes to strike air fields, missile
bases or other targets. It is absurd even to consider
the possibilities of evacuation under these circumstances.
The thermonuclear weapon, with its tremendous destructive
power, and the missile with its great speed, hsve now
made evacuation not only impractical but Impossible. 13
It is Interesting to note in the report of the
committee on fallout protection in New York State that
evacuation time has been limited to one hour. Authorities
^Stanley Melslee, "Charade of Civil Defense,"
Nation . June 11, I960, p. 508.
12Askar Morgenstern, ftie Question of national Defense
(New York: Kandom House, 1959), p. 121.
15Stephen M. Young, "Civil Defense; Billion Dollar
Boondoggle," The Progressive . December i960, p. 18.
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there have recommended that personnel plan on having one hear
after a burst to get home to shelters before the arrival of
fallout.^ The Rand Study In support of the above predicts
that there would be 1 to 10 hours of delay between the explo-
sion of bombs on targets and the arrival of airborne fallout.
**
This delay would give time for entering designated fallout
shelters, strengthening them with sandbags or window closures,
filling with water tanks and packing in home stocks of foods
and billeting evacuees fro»?i the cities.
People 1 8 Attitude
PennWon of Problem
Underlying the public attitude, which waxes and wanes
with the changing climate of international events, is the
growing recognition by careful observers and analysts that the
United states must take its civil-defense seriously. Once the
preoccupation of block wardens and oivlc-mlnded housewives,
civil defense is slowly forcing its way into the highest
councils of national strategy. 1"
To analyze the American attitude toward a shelter
program would require more than the facilities of a Gallup
Poll or the statistical results of a national referendum. This
^Committee on Fallout Protection, Survival in a
ffu9I^ILAjtagk . A report to Governor Melson A. Rockefeller,
State of fiew York, February 15, i960, p. 34.
15The Rand Corporation, op. clt . . p. 7.
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government




ponderous and complex assignment has been viewed by many-
authorities and no two of them have come up with anything
that resembles similar conclusions.
Naturally, the character, background, profession,
sense of values and many other qualities temper the outlook of
each individual as he attempts to define the attitude of other
people. Some people look at others through rose colored
glasses, and there are other analysts who look at people as
being Just no d— good. However, for all the goods and the
faults of these expert analysts it is possible to gain an
interpretation from their conclusions which when accumulated
and refined serve to point out certain strengths, weaknesses,
and trends.
It is apparent from diagnosing many references
published within the last two years that a number of authori-
ties, law-makers, both military and non-military officials
and others view with considerable alarm the negative attitude
of the American people as it pertains to their personal safety
in the event of a nuclear war. This so-called negative
attitude is an all-inclusive term that bars description and
is only used here to express the scope of the problem being
examined. In this case scope is intended to portary the many
mixed undefinable negative reactions of the average American
citizen as he views the problems of civil defense.
Conflicting Views
It should be pointed out in the beginning that there
are many conflicting views on civil defense and in particular
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on fallout protection. There are those who believe that the
weapon effects of massive nuclear attacks are so overwhelming
that civil-defense is useless. Senator Young typifies
followers of that particular sentiment.
In my view no civil-defense program will adequately
protect our citizenry should war strike. The survival
of 180 million Americans— indeed of all mankind
—
depends not on civil defense but peace. It depends
not on futile shelter programs inspired by a cafeman
complex, but on solid, workable international agreements
to disarm. ... In the nuclear age there can be no
realistic civil-defense program. 1 '
It must be admitted that the negative attitude as
evidenced above did respond with at least an active expression
of opinion. What appears to be the main concern, however, is
the alarming showing that many people fail to express any
real interest. President Kennedy has summed it up very nicely
J
We are, I am afraid, in danger of losing something at
the core. '<e are losing that Pilgrim and pioneer
spirit of initiative and Independence—that old
fashioned Spartan devotion to ^duty, honor and
country". ... We take for granted our security,
our liberty, and our future--when we cannot take
any one of them for granted at all. 18
Much has been said about the public apathy of the
American public toward civil-defense measures and many solid
Americans have tried to excuse this indifference on grounds of
failure of communications. Governor Rockefeller says that
It Is due to frustration and fear on the part of the American
17Stephen M. Young, op. cit .. p. 20.
18John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace
(New York j Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 200.
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people which has resulted in their failure to understand the
principles of fallout protection and methods of achieving it. 1 ^
Many experts blame OCDM for failure to enlighten the
American public. Mr. Morgenstern says:
The people themselves are totally lacking sensible
instructions as to what to do, when to do it, how
to discern fallout, how to get rid of it. • . what
preparations to make and how to start life again
should they have survived. 20
Chairman Holifleld tuned pretty close to the real core of the
issue expresses it this way.
No one wants to face the problem of civil-defense
because it is a tremendous problem, and this committee
for over four years has been pointing out what the
problem of civil-defense is in an effort to educate
the American people as to the horrors of nuclear war. 2*
It is only fair at this time to point out that the
Committee on Government Operations praised OCDM for its
activities in the educational field and stated that, "Governor
Hoegh has acted with commendable zeal and energy to 'sell 1
op
civil defense to the American people.' Likewise, Governor
Rockefeller's confidence in the attitude of the American people
met with severe reverses when the New York State Legislature
failed to pass but a token of the shelter program advanced by
"l,lll"l,,IM'l",'w*l*ll",,"**'l',l**,**,,**wll*******>l***>w*>i'****l*' ILlw niiwi—wi wiw mi x, i w imh I —m i M»—i—»«i i n i i '! .»«—i«wwwww i ——
W
j
»wi^in*. . ' l»M «iimw
^Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Need of Reliable Fallout
Protection," White House Conference on Fallout Protection
.
January 25, 1960, p. 24.
20Askar Morgenstern, op. ciy. p. 331.
21
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense ; Hearings, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
I960, p. 6.
2°
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense , op. clt .. p. 2.
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the Committee on Fallout Protection.
A Cross Section Analysis
It is believed appropriate that a cross section of
people's attitudes and reflections on the shelter program be
presented to permit a broader understanding. A recent editor-
ial in a Madison, Wisconsin, newspaper put it that the average
citizen feels the bomb is too big to fight and Dr. Ralph Lapp
says he has concluded that there is ft deep-rooted feeling that
there is no way to escape death from fallout. 23 This attitude
is expressed by many who feel that life would not be worth
living following the aftermaths of nuclear destruction. This
same feeling is expressed in a different way by those people
who accept the Finite Deterrence view embodied in the Air
Force concept of SAC. 2^ These people see no reason for pro-
grams to protect people and property, because they think it
is not feasible to protect either people or property. These
people often argue that it does not matter whether one dies
immediately from blast, heat, or radiation or dies later from
the effects of radioactivity, disease, or starvation—as long
as one is going to die. 2^
There are certain authorities that conclude for all the
2^Non-Military Defense, alsconsln?—A Case Study,
ed. William K. Chipman, Proceedings of A Conference at
The Wisconsin Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
October 1-3, 1959, p. 6.
OilK Herman Khan, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton:
University Press, I960), p. 3.
-'Herman Khan, op. cit . . o. 4.
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educational media, people just do not understand the protective
features of a shelter program. This is expressed in the
following:
We intend to see that by talks and by every nans
media known to man, we bring the substance of the
Rhebhausen (New York Shelter Program) Report to
every citizen of the state, the simple facts that
three to four tiroes as many people will be killed
from fallout as from blast cind thermal effects, and
that most of the fallout victims can be saved. It's
perfectly amazing how few people really understand
these two simple facts. I have a strong feeling
personally that when the women understand that their
children can be saved, if they really understand
this question, then no one needs to worry about
getting this job done; 1 think it can be done
easily then and naturally. 26
Some people do not wish it known that they have
constructed a shelter because of their concern over the world
situation or because they do not want their neighbors to know
it exists. There seems to be a kind of a shame on the part of
people in having an underground shelter or it may be a fear
that their neighbors will rush in and take it away from them.
Chairman Holifield of the Committee on Government Operations
has an interpretation for this attitude:
We have found that there are people who do not want
it disclosed. They want to be certain that they
have the shelter for themselves. They do not want
to make it public knowledge and, therefore, have
everyone in the neighborhood rush in and take over.
A few years ago it used to be a matter of shame.
They were fearful of being known as eccentrics. I
think that is being overcome and I think people now
look at it more as a patriotic service or duty to






??U. 3. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense ; Hearings, op. clt . . p. 48.
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Relationship of Governmental Responsibility
Some figure? In government nl°ce the blame on the
people pointing out that governments can take no substantial
steps while the population rem f .inr —thetie toward non-military
defense. On the other hand other observers believe that the
population will remain apathetic until government has given
strong leadership. This view was put forth by a member of
Congress who stated that, "The Congress is not going to shove
something down the throats of the people that they are not
interested in. If you did, the members of Congress would not
be here very long. ,f2^
Probably one of the moct important lesnone learned in
the past years is that people, if left to their own motivations
for self-protection will do nothing. A report in a national
periodical says that, "Public opinion studies show that less
than 10 percent of the population will build shelters or take
other preparatory measures against threatened disaster.'
"
^uoh authorities as Charles E. Fritz of the NAS-NRC Disaster
Research '^roup implies that greater action on the part of
government is needed in civil-defense protection. He says:
We must stop thinking of American society as if it
were simply a collection of individuals or families
who are individually responsible for the defense of
the homeland. The realistic unit of administration
and management in a nuclear attack is the nation as
whole* 30
2%on-Mllitarv Defense, Wisconsin—A Case Study
,
op. clt
. , p. 67*
29David Allison, "Fallout Shelters at Once, Archi-




Whatever the present reaction of the public to effec-
tive programs for non-military defense, it is very likely that
after a frightening crisis had occurred the public would not
only demand a national shelter program, but would be highly
critical of the government for not having taken the necessary
action. Consider a crisis over Berlin or an expanding war in
Laos where United States and Russia were unable to reach an
international agreement. The lesson appears to be that the
American People, who have not faced the threat of continental
hostilities since 1815, aay not show much interest now in non-
military defense, simply because they have not given it much
thought or because they may in some cases feel it to be
hopeless.
It is difficult not to conclude that our population
would be receptive, on the whole, to proposals for a serious
program of non-military defense, provided it were advanced by
governmental leaders at the highest level. Public resentment
would probably be profound were a crisis to drive home the
fact that the nation lay nearly naked to enemy attack. CIA
Chief Allen Dulles has warned:
If they succeed and we fail, it will only be because
of our complacency—and because they have devoted a
far greater share of their power, skill, and resources
to our destruction than we have been willing to
dedicate to our own preservation. 31
31
John F. Kennedy, op. clt .. p. 198.
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Status of Shelter Program
A Bird's-Eye View
The status of non-military defense based on an evalua-
tion of the American attitude is one that concerns mainly
responsible government officials. It is a debatable question
at this time how much of this authoritarian concern for shelter
protection has been transformed into concrete action. While
it is not possible to document this view, it is probable that
if an attack were to come during 1961, with only a few hours
warning, existing civil defense preparations throughout the
United States would not reduce civilian deaths to a substantial
degree. It iB apparent that the bulk of the funds so far
invested in non-military defense have been absorbed by
administration, research, and planning which is most necessary,
but which has not yet generated a substantial capability for
saving life.'2
New York is so far the only state to have given serious
consideration to a program of fallout shelter. In a report
submitted to Governor Rockefeller early in I960 a Special
Task Force concluded that a very high degree of protection from
fallout could be achieved within a reasonably short time and
at a cost within reach of the people of the sta.te. The Task
Force recommended:
32Non-Military Defense, Wisconsin—A Case Study
.
op. cit
. , p. 4.
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That laws be passed requiring all new construction
within the State to provide shielding from fallout
up to a minimum specified date to provide fallout
protection for their occupants. The report also
recommended that financial incentives for shelter
construction be provided to homeowners, to include,
among others, the exclusion of shelter improvements
from local real estate taxes. 33
It is apparent that either the people, or the legislators or
both did not feel the urgency of such a program for the
proposed bill to implement these features failed to gain the
necessary support to be enacted into law.
United States Congress. Civil Defense Hearings
Although many studies have been accomplished in regard
to the various aspects of civil defense it is doubtful whether
any one single group in this country is better acquainted with
the overall problems than the Committee on Government Operations
which chaired by Representative Chet Holifield conducted hear-
ings on civil defense during the spring of I960. The opinion
of this committee is as good an analysis of the present status
of civil defense as can be attained. Chairman Holifield said:
Those who examine the material will find, I believe,
that civil defense throughout the country as a whole
is in a deplorable stste. . . . Lack of progress
applies to civil defense generally, but in the case
of shelters particularly, it is evident, to me at
least, that the national shelter policy has been a
failure. My concept of shelter protection requires
more than education and exhortation. It requires a
program of construction. 34
The Committee reported that it had gathered information
from 35 states and 66 cities in conducting an evaluation of the
f U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government Opera*tions, Civil Defense , Hearings, op. clt . . p. 3.
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shelter program. -'-> The states reported:
1. I665 home fallout shelters constructed
2. 14 public buildings modified structurally to
provide for shelters
3. 5 underground civil defense control centers constructed.
4. 8 underground dual-purpose control centers constructed
5. 4 public schools modified for fallout protection plus
one planned
The cities reported j
1. 356 home fallout shelters constructed
2. 9 public buildings modified structurally to provide
for shelters
3. 9 underground civil defense control centers constructed
4. 7 underground dual-purpose control eenters constructed
5. 1 public school modified for fallout protection
plus one planned
Although the figures shown above are lacking in com-
plete accuracy, it is evident that shelter construction within
private homes, public buildings and schools is proceeding at
pn unacceptably slow rate. There is considerable evidence
that OCDM has made extensive effort through the media of radio,
TV, press and other communication programs to bring home to
the American public the dire need for radioactive protection
shelters. 36 Whether the objectives of this program have been
aocoir plished is debatable. Governor Hoegh has outlined
OCDM's policy in this regard:
Information and education programs are vital to the
shelter policy. The first need for action by the
individual citizen Is knowledge. Americans must
know the "why" and then the "how" of shelter
protection to be motivated to protect their
families. 37
On the other hand Governor Orville Freeman of Minnesota takes a
35Ibid. , p. 2. 36 Ibjd. .. p. 42.
37




The announcement of the national policy on shelters
by Governor Hoegh in 1958, while gratifying to me,
is inadequate in that the ireans to crrry out the
monumental educational program did not exist at
that time, nor does it at the present. ... It is
not enough thft pamphlets are distributed, television
and radio programs and newspaper articles appear
supporting such a program. The Government itself
must act and until our State legislatures see
shelters incorporated in new Federal buildings
and existing Federal buildings to provide full
protection, they are unwilling to appropriate
State money for this purpose. 38
In tile 2 years since announcement of the "National Shelter
Plan", few tangible achievements can be found. There is no
plan in the sense of a schedule of performance in regard to
the construction of shelters or no method to measure accomplish-
ments. The Committee is, of the opinion that despite the
expenditure of considerable funds by OCDM in an education
and information program comparatively few shelters of any
description have been constructed in the united States. 59
The construction of shelters within both new and
existing Federal buildings has progressed at a relatively
slow rate. Based on the national shelter policy, shelter
construction is provided in the following manner according to
Governor Hoegh:
1. The Administration provides leadership and example
by incorporating fallout shelters in appropriate
new Federal buildings.
2. The Administration endeavors to incorporate
38
Ibid. » p. 49.
™U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government







fallout shelters in existing Federal buildings
to provide leadership and set an example for
the owners of existing commercial and industrial
•-ui?.dmgs.40
OCDK efforts to set an exaaple for the Nation aa a whole by
incorporating fallout shelter in existing and new Federal
buildings thus far have met with failure. To date request
for funds for fallout shelters was included for only one
project in the fiscal vear budget estimates la the new building
category.^ For existing buildings the :+SA has studied 10
Federal buildings but no modifications hp.ve been undertaken. 42
Governor Hoegh's reply to this was that to implement the
national shelter policy in fiscal years 1959 and I960, the
President has asked for ^29, 120, 000 and only received
#10, 284,000. 45
In defense of OCDM's apparent failure to stimulate
shelter construction, Q-overnor Hoegh contended in his testimony
to the subcommittee that considerable shelter spree for
protection against fallout exists in the United States.
Despite a lack of specific data on the number of fallout
shelters actually constructed, he maintained, that sufficient
information was available to enable him to make a firm
estimate on the total shelter spaces presently existing. His
^U. 3. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civj,! Defense; Hearings, op. pit . , p. 9.
-*-U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
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estimate was that over 25 percent of the United States popula-
tion could be accommodated by existing shelter spaces. Governor
Hoegh stated before the Committee:
Based upon the sampling surveys we have made in
various communities, based upon the Information
which we have about those existing facilities
which have a potential factor of sufficient
magnitude to protect people from fallout and,
secondly, based upon our own observations and
on our information from industries and from
citizens and from local and State directors, I
am confident that as of today we have shelter
spaces of sufficient protection factor for 25
percent of the people in this Nation. 44
The above estimate was strongly contested by the Committee
which considered it unrepresentative of the existing condi-
tions. It stated, "Governor Hoegh 's oft-repeated estimate
that 25 percent of the United States population can be
sheltered in existing structures is not borne out by the
pilot surveys, on which he stated his estimate was based. M45
Supplementary Problems
The main supporting considerations involved in a
shelter program are those requirements of food, water, medical,
sanitation, and radiation monitoring equipment which are
vitally needed to sustain life in a confined condition. It
is not difficult to assess the lack of value of a well




U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense; Twenty-First Intermediate Report,
op. pit . . p. 15.
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supporting provisions. It would likewise not be difficult
to imagine the hardships and radiation risks that occupants
of this shelter would be subjected to if it were necessary
for them to leave ite protection for long periods of time in
search of food, water and medication. There has been
established the theory that sufficient food, water, and other
necessities of life would be available after an indeterminate
period of shelter living when the radiation level has lowered
to permit outdoor habitation. It is obvious then that the
value of these shelters are really only as high as they are
properly equipped.
It is not the intention of this thesis to consider
these related factors as part of the evaluation of the shelter
program. However, it is likewise impractical to consider a
shelter program without acknowledging that unless these
supplementary provisions are acquired by the individual or
government, there would be little wisdom in the promotion of
shelter protection.
Thus in order that the goal of this thesis is not
dragged under by its many attachments, a detailed analysis of
these considerations will be omitted. This action is taken
with due knowledge of the problem at hand which appears
national in scope:
The national master plan for civil defense which
this subcommittee recommended for adoption in 1956
was based on the key measure of shelter protection
from the blast, thermal and radiation effects of
nuclear weapons. • . . Despite the general acceptance
of the basic requirement for shelter protection,
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it is apparent to the subcommittee that civil-
defense planning for postattick. recovery and
rehabilitation is being prosecuted at every








A PRACTICAL SHELTER PROGRAM
Shelter Types pnd Characteristics
General
To determine an adequate shelter program requires a
consideration of three major points. These points being
fallout, blast and a combination of fallout and blast protec-
tion. In the past several years repeated studies have
confirmed the national necessity for shelter but no decision
to initiate the costly new program has as yet been made.
The principal requirement for fallout protection is
that there be a mass of material between the shelter occupants
and the radioactive fallout.* The more dense the materials,
the more effective the protection. Of the dense materials,
earth is, of course, the most readily available and the
cheapest. An underground shelter is shielded by the earth
around it. An above-ground Bhelter covered with earth
provides good shielding. Other construction materials, such
as poured concrete, concrete block, brick, clay tile filled
^Leo A. Hoegh, "Feasibility of Fallout Shelter and
Relation of Fallout Shelter," White House Conference on




with sand, and steel, fiberglass-reinforced plastics, and
treated wood, covered with earth, are relatively inexpensive
and provide excellent shielding from fallout. 2
Fallout Shelter
Adequate fallout shelter can be constructed at from
$25 to $150 per person. The lowest figure |25, applies to
"do-it-yourself" family shelters in basements, ^here separate
independent structures are required for fallout shelter the
cost may run $150 per person or more. The cost for most
shelters will fall between these two extremes. Cost tends to
be lower when the shelter can be incorporated in new buildings
at the time of design. There probably will be large areas
where homes and home basements will provide adequate fallout
protection. Governor Hoegh emphasizes:
All families should provide themselves with the
fallout protection recommended in OCDM family fallout
shelter manual. With this standard of protection,
all our people who survive the initial blast and
thermal effects could survive the effects of fallout
in a nuclear war.
3
Fallout shelters appear to be • better investment than
blast shelters for a number of reasons:
1. The lethal fallout area is expected to be much
larger than the blast damage area;
2. Fallout protection is more easily and cheaply
provided, since at least 25 percent of the
population can be sheltered in existing
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*U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Civil Defense : Hearings, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Washington, D. C, I960, p. 8.
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3. Blast shelters can be overcome by saturation attacks;
4. Blast shelters, to be effective, require warning
and this can not be guaranteed against missile
attack; fallout shelter, on the other hand, would
not be required until after the nuclear weapon
had landed;
5. There ie always the possibility, in the distant
future, that concentrated areas can be defended
against missile or bomber attack, but there is no
such prospect for defense against shifting
radioactive fallout.
If first priority is given to fallout shelter, maximum
use can be made of existing structures. Attention should be
focused on family- type shelters with attendant problems of
administration, stocking, maintenance and land acquisition.
It should not be overlooked that some community shelters will
be required, particularly in areas where the predominant type
of construction does not include basements.
Improvised fallout shelters, even if only capable of
reducing radiation of l/20 to l/30 of the radiPtion outside,
could have a signifiesnt effect in reducing casualties among
people outside the areas of blast damage. There seem to be
many possibilities of Identifying and preparing such shelters
in existing buildings in small cities and towns. Even buildings
whose structural characteristics provide smaller attenuation
factors could be quite useful, with arrangements for washing
down or sweeping the roofs and surrounding areas.
An essential element in the use of such improvised
A
The Rand Corporation, Report on a study of Non-
Military Defense , Report 322-RC, 1958, p. 5.
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fallout shelters would be radiation meters. ^ The meters would
indicate how long outside activity could continue (until heavy-
fallout arrived), would -ruide Immediate decontamination work,
would show when it was safe to emerge from the shelters, and
would continue to be needed In postwar organization.
An often-neglected possibility Is the use of suitably
located mines for both fallout and blast protection. Mines for
low-priced ores, such as limestone, sandstone, rock salt, and
gypsum, typically consist of a regular pattern of rooms with
level floors and 10 to 12 foot ceilings, comoletely self
supporting and dry.^ Such mines could be provided with water
tanks, latrines, utilities, and some air-conditioning equipment,
and could be stocked with a bedroll for each person, cold
processed rations, and some medical supplies,
gXast Shelter
Despite the clearcut superiority of fallout shelter as
b general proposition, there sre certain areas which will
probably suffer extensively from blest damage and where fallout
shelter vould probably be of little value. Tucson, Arizona
ringed by aluiilc bsses and cities with high concentrations of
population are prime example?. Studies have shown that in the
event of oopulrtion-oriented attack, or even a mixed popula-
tion and military attack, a large percent of the population
could be saved by blast rhelter.
An engineering study of a, system of deep rock shelters
-Ibid. 6 Ibld .. p. 6.
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under Manhattan Island for 4 million people indicated a cost of
1500 to ^700 per person, depending largely on habitability
standards. The shelters were to be excavated 800 feet below
the surface, using conventional excavation and mining techniques.
Some 97 entrances were planned and distributed according to
population, so that every point in Manhattan was within 5 to
p
10 minutes walking distance of an entrance.
A wide range of shelter designs providing blast
protection of 50 to 200 psi seems to be possible using conven-
tional construction techniques—shallow underground location,
reinforced concrete or corrugated— steel material and heavy
air-tight blast doors.
A Consideration of Proposed Shelters
An Immediate Program—Rand
A non-military defense program costing t200 million to
$300 million could probably be accomplished in a relatively
short time by concentrating on a system of Improvised fallout
shelters outside the large cities. 9 such a program would
include the following elements: identification of existing
buildings in small cities and towns that provide high attenuation
factors against fallout; provision of sandbags, water tanks, and
other minimal supplies needed to convert these buildings into
operating fallout shelters for short-term occupancy; widespread
distribution of radiation meters; preparations to take advantage
7Ibid ., p. 7. 8 Ibid .
9 lbid., p. 33.
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of partial strategic evacuation, in case international tension
should make it desirable; planning and practice of tactical
evacuation of cities for which fallout accommodations are
available in a belt 20 to 50 miles away from the center. 10
It is estimated that none of these actions would be
very expensive, and the resulting system might cover only part
of the population, yet in appropriate circumstances they
might save millions of lives.
A Delayed Program—Stanford Research Institute
Studies at Stanford Research Institute have indicated
that effective shelter systems can be designed for costs which
are small in comparison with the country's total defense budget.
This program would involve construction of special
fallout shelters. In this case, the government would
bear the cost of the shelters and the emergency
supplies in addition to the expense of warning,
monitoring and the like. A program of this scope
would cost in the order of |5 billion per year if
completed in six years. This is equivalent to an
annual eost of about $30 per person. 11
It is estimated this program could add 60 to 90 million
survivors over and above the number who would survive with no
program. It would provide adequate fallout protection in any
attack on the United States at least through the I960* a. 12
However, in attacks against population centers this program
could not prevent millions of blast casualties.
10 Ibid.
11Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of The National
Academy of Sciences and The National Research Counoil,
The Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Hon-military




An extended program would provide maximum shelter
against immediate blast effects in metropolitan areas plus
fallout shelters elsewhere. If this program were to be
completed in eight years, it would cost about |5 billion per
year for the blast shelter portion of the program, but the
fallout portion of the program would cost less because fallout
shelters would no longer be needed in cities. -^ j^^B program
would add approximately 80 million more survivors than would be
saved by a fallout shelter orogram in the case of a heavy
attack against military and population targets.
A State Program—Rockefeller Proposal for Kew York C-tate
One of the most far reaching shelter programs proposed
to date are included in the SJew York State program. Its
principle points are outlined below:
1. The protection program should be centered on
the home and family.
2. Civil defense planning should be based on getting
as many individuals as possible back to their own
homes within 1 hour after the blast.
3« Home protection should be supplemented v?ith
reasonable protection at places of business and
industry, schools end other publicly owned buildings,
and other occuoied non-residential structures.
4. Individual shelter areas should maintain inventories
of emergency supplies end equipment for 2 weeks survival
without outside helo.
5. Require existing residences to provide minimum
fallout protection for all regular occupants by no
later than July 1, 1963.
6. Pequire new residences of all types under construction




7. Require existing business, commercial, and industrial
premises to have by July 1, 1963, minimum protection
available for employees who could not be expected to
reach their homee v?ithin 1 hour after attack.
8. Enact tax relief measures to (a) exclude the cost
of shelter construction from local assessment for tax
purposes, up to a maximum of 100 per planned occupant,
(b) exclude the cost of shelter construction on from
any applicable State tax based on the cost of real
property; and (c) permit deduction of shelter construc-
tion costs from taxable income from hev York State
income tax purposes, up to a nailEum of ivlOO per
planned occupant. 1*
The report of the New York State committee estimated that home
shelters for all tfte people of the State would cost an average
of |50 to |T5 Pr r person sheltered. Minima survival supplies
and equipment for 2 weeks were estimated to cost an additional
•15 to §25 per person.
Budget Requirements
The need for adequate funds to fulfill all the require-
ments of civil defense is recognized. h^tever the reasons for
national reluctance to undertake B serious program of non-
military defense, it is indisputable that the program as viewed
across the nation has not progressed much beyond the level of
planning. Table .4 shows funds appropriated to date for non-
military defense. Table 5 shows a comparison of appropriations
and a breakdown of expenditures.
14
U. 3. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense ; Twenty-First Intermediate Report,





FEDERAL FUNDS FOR NON-MILITARY
DEFENSE
Fiscal Budget Funds Approps
.
National % of Nat'l.





1951 403M 32M 8 33 , 900M 0.11^
1962 537 77 14 46 , 400 0.17
1953 602 44 7 49,300 0.09
1954 153 49 32 41,200 0.12
1955 88 50 57 39,100 0.13
1956 78 71 91 40,300 0.18
1957 125 98 78 44,300 0.22
1958 132 42 32 44,300 0.09
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In direct relation to the shelter program, the Federal Government
through appropriated funds has instructed people in protective
measures, conducted a sample survey of existing shelter capa-
bilities, accelerated shelter research, and constructed proto-
type shelters for example and guidance. As can be analyzed from
the above very little completed hardware in any form has been
obtained.
The OCDM Budget has requested $104,200,000 for fiscal
ye°r 1962 and represents an increase of $44,075,000 over fiscal
1961 appropriations. ^5 The major portion of the increase is
for procurement for the civil defense medical stockpile. Twelve
million dollars is for continuing implementation of Public Law
606. Under this law, Federal funds are made available to
States and local governments for matching the costs of civil
defense personnel and administration.
Prudent concern for the protection of the civilian
population from hazards in a nuclear world makes it necessary
to recommend Increases for 1962 in appropriations for civil
defense. Under this policy the Congress has been urged to
provide funds for inclusion of fallout shelters in appropriate
new and existing Federal buildings. Funds and appropriate
legislation are being requested to accelerate these activities
in 1962. In addition legislation is being proposed to require
appropriate fallout shelters in certain new private construction
where the Federal Government provides some form of financial
1R
-'Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Information
Bulletin
.




assistance. This legislation will also provide for a 1-year
program of grants to States to assist in the construction of
fallout protection shelters in selected State buildings. Upon
the enactment of this legislation, supplemental appropriations
will be required. _he proposed shelter legislation carries no
request for funds. These would be requested in supplemental
ropriations.
In the last few years the United States government has
been spending between *50 million and |100 million a year on
non-military defense measures discussed above. However, a good
deal could probably be done with expenditures as small as two
to three times recent annual budgets, particularly by taking
advantage of existing assets.
Frank B. Ellis, the new Director of the OCDM, is pressing
a demand for a program almost tripled in size. He has indicated
an adherence to the demand that the civil defence program be
expanded to j300, 000, 000. 16
Mr. Ellis argues that the Pentagon's newly announced
emphasis on a strategic missile and bomber force able to
"ride out" a first enemy blow requires corresponding high-level
attention to protection of civil government centers and the
civilian population.
With added outlays of £200,000,000 a year, he declares,
enough fallout shelter and medical and food supplies can be
mustered to save at least 30,000,000 lives in case of all-out-
^The Sew York Times . %'lde Aims Pushed For Civil




Mr. Morgenstern's opinion is similar.
Perhaps a simple shelter progrftB would cost thirty to
fifty billion dollars spread over some years. . . .
T;/hat does this matter when the alternative is to
lose some additional fifty million people or even
more? ... Wo one can doubt that the American economy
can produce enough cement, steam shovels, bulldozers,
employ sufficiently large labor forces, and make the
necessary organizational effort to procure at least
fall-out shelters in a really short time. IB
Side Effects
There are obviously, other effects to be gained by
sdootlng a nation-wide shelter urogram. Though these are
relatively unimportant when considering the critical ity of
survival, the indirect benefits are worthy of review.
there has been adopted a fairly strong opinion by
many authorities that fallout shelters built on a national
scale would influence the pattern of a possible Soviet attack
and weaken its attack position. The Rand Study concludes;
If fallout shelters were built outside major target
cities and evacuation planned in advance, Soviet
planners would be obliged to reckon on a much larger
commitment of second-salvo missiles or aircraft to
destroy all of the war-making capability of this
country which might make the attack less attractive
to them. On the other hand without effective non-
military defense in this country, the Soviets might
be more tempted to attack population centers, than
if they knew that there existed well organized schemes
for evacuation of city populations to fallout shelters.
A fairly modest missile or aircraft effort might destroy
so large a proportion of our population, if they are
17Ibld .
18Askar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense
(New York: Random House, 1959) » p. 119.
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unprotected that the Country might neither retain
the will nor the ability to fight. x9
Mr. Rogers Cannell supports the above ooinion and estimates
that we could lose with our limited civil protection about 25
percent of our population. He says:
Should our damaged forces strike b°ck from an
attack they would be assaulting sn enemy whose
population has been trained in civil defense and has
adequate warning to evacuate and make fallout
shelters. Miy attack returned to the United States
from Russia's damaged forces would probably be aimed
at our cities and industry, since our retaliatory
bases would be empty. Under these circumstances
our chances of survival would depend upr>n just
how many of our people we could protect from the
attack by evacuation and hastily built fallout
shelters, tfith Americans inadequately informed
or ill-orepared to react properly in 3Uoh a situation,
it is questionable whether we would dare to launch
a missive retaliation considering the vulnerability
of our people. 2°
A speedy and large-scale shelter construction program
could upset the strategic balanoe existing at the time of the
initiation of the program in favor of the shelter-building
country. Its effects are the same as those of any other
weapons crash program. Applying this principle to the shelter
program, it is easy to see that it would take very long to
build shelters against blast, but not so very long to get
fallout shelters. A country engaging in a large shelter program
is literally "digging in" and may well give the Impression
19
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that it is getting ready to attack. 21 This interpretation
will be unavoidable, no matter what peaceful intentions are
officially declared at that time. A shelter program is a major
change in the balance between the two countries and therefore
cannot be viewed with equanimity by the enemy.
Active defense and non-military defense mutually support
each other. The mere existence of active-defense forces
helps to limit civilian casualties by compelling the enemy
to launch larger raids, which are more likely to be detected
and thus provide warning. Moreover, active defense may cause
further diversion of weapons from city targets to air-defense
targets and to the task of penetrating SAC targets.
On the other hand, non-military defense measures
contribute most importantly to active defense by making
attainable levels of performance worth while. Rand says:
An effective non-military defense system could sharply
reduce the number of casualties per enemy bomb, and
thus give an active defense system capable of screening
out a substantial fraction of the enemy weapons, even
if not all of them a more important role in the
national defense. Non-military defense also helps
active defense in more technioal ways—such as by
making the enemy attempt more accurate (and more
easily disturbed) delivery systems, and by permitting
the defensive use of larger atomic weapons at closer
range. 22
There has been established within the framework of this
thesis the conclusion that Soviet foreign policy will not be
21Askar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense
(New York: Random House, 1959), P» 130.
22
The Rand Corporation, Report on a Study of Non-
^llltary Defense
. 1958, p. 39.
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deterred from a posture of aggressive international moves
designed to probe the weaknesses of the foreign policy of
mainly the United States and generally the nations of the
Free World. In the years ahead, willingness to make foreign
policy decisions carrying a risk of war may be important to
meet major Soviet challenges that threaten United States
security. The more effective the defense of civilian society,
the easier it will be for United States leaders to make such
decisions. Deterrence of extremely provocative enemy behavior
other than a direct attack on the United States might thus be
maintained as national policy. The Rand Study is of the
opinion that if non-military defense measures caused Soviet
leaders to believe that aggressive moves would meet firm
resistance, they would be less likely to take such provocative
actions. 23 Deterrence of aggressions against countries other
than the United States might also be accomplished by strengthen-
ing United States capability to meet limited aggression in a
limited way. Former Secretary of State Herter has emphasized
the direct relationship that exists between a fallout shelter
24program and the successful conduct of foreign policy. Former
Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas stated:
I am sure that a strong civil defense program will
be an increasingly important element of our deterrent
posture. Better protection for our civil population
will strengthen the conviction and credibility of our
firm policy to meet aggression with force. 25
23 Ibid ., p. 1.
^Special Committee on Civil Defense of the Governor's
Council, Statement, White House Conference on Fallout
Protection , January 25, I960, p. 3.
t
-5jaBjes H. Douglas, 'Nature of Threat and Importance of
Civil Defense," frftilte House Conference on Fallout Protection .
January 25, I960, p. 10.

CENTER IV
THE ROL'i OF GOVERNMENT
National Policy
The National Plan for Civil defense and Defense
Mobilization was established by Reorganization Plan Number 1
of 1953 and promulgated by President Fisenhower.
Within the framework of this plan was established the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the Director of
which was assigned the responsibility to manage and direct the
civil defense and defense mobilization programs of the United
States.
The National Plan itself is a statement of principles,
responsibilities, requirements and broad courses of action,
which defines that the responsibility for civil defense shall
be vested jointly la the Federal Government, the severe! states
and their political subdivisions. It was apparent the inten-
tions of Congress to assign to the protection of the population
all levels of government, federal, state, and local.
Nelson A. Rockefeller, ''Need for State and Local
Initiative in Stimulating Individual Action," White House
Conference on Fallout Protection, i^shington, D. C,




Functions of Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The federal Civil Defens e Agency
The Office of Civil and Defenee Mobilization (OCDM),
was created in 1958 by combining the old offices of the Federal
Civil Defense Agency (FCDA) and Office of Defense Mobilization
(ODM). ?
Previously the FCDA had been created in 1951 on
recommendations from the Defense Department*! Office of Civil
Defense Planning by Civil Defense Act, Public Law 920.3 -phis
law provided in pert that the responsibility for civil defense
should be vested primarily in the several states and their
political sub-divisions. The Federal government was to provide
necessary coordination and guidance as authorized.
In this situation, where the primary responsibility was
on the states' and cities, the Federal government carried on
numerous programs to advance Federal preparedness activities and
to it the states in their a. Samples of the activities to
encourage Federal preparedness included a stockpile program to
place needed materials in areas where they would be available,
pre-positioning of hospitals, and research projects to discover
and evaluate civil defense protection.^ FCDi, developed the
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be based. It set uio the national warning system which was
designed to give immediate warning to points in the system.
5
Creation of Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Public Law 85-606 was created in 1958 and in the same
year the President in his Reorganization Plan Number 1 combined
the ODM and FCDA into the present OCDM.^ The changes resulting
from this legislation assigned an increased role and responsi-
bility to the Federal government in the area of civil defense.
Instead of resting primarily on the states and sub-divisions,
the responsibility for civil defense is now vested jointly in
the Federal government and the several states and their sub-
divisions. This is brought out by the fact that to the former
Federal responsibility for coordination, guidance, and assistance
was added a fourth responsibility, namely, that for direction.?
The agency was likewise given authority to expand its contri-
butions program and make funds available to share state and
local personnel and administrative expenses.
The National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization
Under the merger Governor Hoegh became the first
Director of OCDM and was responsible for promulgation of the
National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization which
was published in October of 1958. This is the basic civil
5 Ibid .
UU. S. Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization,
National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization




defense plan which serves as an assembly of fundamental policies,
responsibilities, and procedures which are given expression in
the form of operating plans and detailed action measures. It
has been and will be amplified by annexes and these in turn by
auxiliary documents, encompassing the whole of civil defense
and defense mobilization concepts and operations, and uniting
it all under one administrator. It is a national plan that is
designed to coordinate the activities of other Federal agencies,
and state and local governments.
The Promulgation of the Plan contained a statement by
the President to the Nation, telling why we need the civil
defense and defense mobilization program, and established the
basis for the program's execution. It declared, in part, that
the Director, OCDM shall manage and direct the civil defense
and defense mobilization programs of the United States. It
likewise directed that agencies of the Executive Branch of the
Federal 0-overnment shall plan, prepare, and undertake actions
for the execution of this plan as assigned by the Director.
The National Shelter Plan
The plan for shelter protection as was devised by the
Federal government and as stated in Annex 10, The National
Shelter Plan, of the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense
Mobilization is to provide the stimulation, leadership, guidance
and example necessary for the American people to make prepara-
tions for shelter. This will be accomplished by coordination
8
Ibid
. , pp, 3-6.
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with state and local governments and will be pointed at
emphasising the responsibility of the individual property
owner to provide protection on his own premises. As stated
in the National Shelter Plant
Private organizations and individuals will
expedite and facilitate the provision of shelter
in accordance with the shelter activities of
the jurisdictions in which their properties are
located. 9
It is important that the national policy in regard to
shelter protection be stated, inasmuch as this serves as the
basic guide for OCBft's prosecution of the national plan.
Interpretation of this policy is based on the list of assump-
tions as taken from the National Shelter Plan:
1. Highest priority is to be given to providing
for a national active military capability for
retaliation and defense against attack. This is
the chief deterrent to war since it may eventually
have the capability of effectively preventing an
enemy from striking intended targets.
2. With adequate shelter protection a successful
attack on the Nation would be more difficult and
the temptation of an aggressor to launch an attack
would be substantially lessened.
3. In event of nuclear attack, the danger from
radioactive fallout would be widespread, long
term and intense. The effects of fallout can
be significantly reduced by fallout shelter. 1°
State Participation
For the past ten years Federal civil defense legislation
9Ibid . , p. Hi.
1
3
U. S. Office of Civil and Defence Mobilization,
Ijatlonal Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization
,
(Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1958,
Annex 10) , pp. 2-3.
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and administrative action have been shaped by the belief that
only by individual action through state and local programs will
adequate shelter protection for the Ration be achieved. This
system places complete reliance at the state and local level to
provide the necessary motivation of John h. Public and only
asks in return that Federal activity be limited to providing
certain funds, education, technical assistance, conducting
research as necessary and providing required coordination to
tie in supplemental programs with the various Federal agencies
and states. A strong adherent of the states' rights movement
has been Governor Rockefeller of flew York who said;
egardless, however, of the level of effort of the
Federal government, regardless of the level of
funds which the Federal government may make
available, regardless of the inducements and
incentives which the Federal government may
offer looking to the development of fallout
protection, there will remain, as an essential
of any successful prograa for providing fallout
protection for our citizens, the need for State
inltiative.il
At their annual Conference in Puerto Kioo in August of I960
the assembled State Governors declared their personal and
official responsibility, as Governor, for the protection of
their people against the hazard of fallout in the event of a
nuclear war. In keeping with this sense of responsibility,
they unanimously adopted both the report of their Special
Committee on Civil Defense and a four point resolution calling
for:
11 Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Need for State and Local
Initio tive in Stimulating Individual Action," loc. clt.
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First - Vigorous State initiative in a campaign of
education about the fallout hazard and
protection against it.
Second - Immediate steps by all levels of government,
state and local as well as Federal, to assist
their citizens to survive radioactive fallout
and the related consequences of a nuclear
attack upon our country.
Third - State initiative to survey the adequacy of
fallout protection in State owned or operated
facilities and the steps which should be
taken to achieve such protection.
Fourth - State initiative in developing a protected
seat of state government to assure government
leadership and functioning both during and
after a nuclear attack. 12
Probably the most enthusiastic advocate of the shelter theory,
Governor Rockefeller proposed that the legislature of the state
of New York enact laws making it compulsory that every home and
building be equipped with a bomb shelter. Senator Young has
taken exception to this plan and stated that for government,
either state or Federal, to assume the power to force people to
build shelters is a sizable intrusion on individual rights. *5
James H. Douglas, former Deputy Secretary of Defense is of the
opinion thgt we are on the right track in providing information,
plans and encouragement at the Federal level, and placing
primary reliance upon the states to secure effective action by
Americans in their home communities in implementing the Federal
shelter policy. He says, "Civil defense is something that
people can do largely for themselves, with assistance in credit,
12
Nelson A. Rookefeller, "introductory Statement,"
white House Conference on Fallout Protection . Washington, D. C,
January 25, I960, p. 5.
13 i,Stephen M. Young, "Civil Defense; Billion Dollar
Boondoggle," The Progressive , December I960, p. 18.
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and planning and guidance, 1 ^-
The advocates of state responsibility concerning fallout
protection base their arguments on the belief that fallout is
another element affecting the health and safety of the citizens
and thus comes under the classic area of state and local concern
and local responsibility. ^5 Fallout protection would thus fall
within the range of operation of local codes and regulations
and of the local inspection and enforcement agencies. Mr.
Rockefeller says:
Since such matters as these are already matters of
extensive state and local regulation, inspection and
enforcement, any adaptations of these regulatory
systems as may be needed to meet the new hazards of
radioactive fallout roust, if we are to avoid multi-
plicity of regulation and administrative confusion,
necessarily be left to state and local initiative
and not to federal action. 16
Federal Participation
In order to implement the National Shelter Plan which
emphasizes coordination with state and local governments the
OCDM has adopted a national shelter policy which is designed
to limit federal participation by the following elements:
1. The Administration is bringing to every American
all of the facts as to the possible effects of
nuclear attack and is informing him of the steps
which he and his State and local government can
take to minimize such effects.
14James H. Douglas, 'Nature of Threat and Importance
of Civil Defense," Vfolte House Conference op Fallout
Protection
.
Washington, D. C, January 25, I960, p. 11.







2. The Administration is conducting surveys of
existing structures on a sampling basis, in order
to assemble definite information on the capabilities
of existing structures to provide fallout shelter,
particularly in the larger cities.
3. The Administration is accelerating research in
order to show how fallout shelters may be incor-
porated in existing, as well as in new, buildings
—
whether in homes, other private buildings, or govern-
ment structures. Designs of shelters are being
perfected to assure the most economical and effective
types.
4. The Administration is constructing a limited
number of prototype shelters of various kinds, suitable
to differing geographical and climatic areas. These
are dual-purpose shelters which will have practical
peacetime uses. Upon completion they will be tested
by actual occupancy by differing numbers of people
for realistic periods of time.
5. The Administration is providing leadership and
example by providing for the incorporation of fallout
shelters in appropriate new and existing Federal
buildings hereafter designed for civilian use. 17
In support of the above policy OCDM has instituted
action by certain Federal agencies which are designed to support
the national shelter policy above. These are recent measures
involving Federal loan or grants-in-aid programs.
1. The 1961 budget will include funds for incor-
poration of fallout shelters in all new civilian
Federal structures determined to be suitable.
2. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and
the Veterans Administration have announced that
fallout shelters will be eligible items in determining
valuation for loans or loan insurance. In addition,
FHA, home- improvement loans are available to finance
building of fallout shelter in existing structures.
3. The Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHF%) and
the Community Facilities Administration have announced
17
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense ; Hearings, 86th Cong., 2d Sees.,
Washington, D. C, I960, p. 8.
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that fallout shelters may be included in projects
qualifying for Federal loans and advances under
its College Housing Program, its Public Facilities
Loan Program , and its Project Planning Program.
4. The Department of Health has announced that
grants for hospital construction under the Hill-
Burton Act will be eligible for incorporation of
fallout shelters.
5. The HHFA and the Urban Renewal Administration
Will make "Master Planning" grants to local authorities
available for planning the incorporation of fallout
shelters in urban redevelopment projects. In addition,
local authorities may include fallout shelters in site
development improvements and receive full credit
toward the local share of the project. IS
The view, which has been adopted by the OCDM and represents the
official policy of the Executive Brsnch, is that each individual
citizen must be prepared to take care of himself and his family
in the event of an enemy attack. Limited Federal assistance is
planned, but outside help for individuals is expected to come
primarily from State and local civil defense efforts. -^
Criticism of Fed era 1^/' ct lvity
Proponents of greater federal participation in civil
defense are many and their viewpoints indicate immediate changes
are necessary. The subcommittee in what it terms a realistic
view believes that if the Federal government doesn't supply the
func's and direct a construction program for communal shelters,
Leo A. Hoegh, "Feasibility of Fallout Shelter and
Relstlon of Fallout Shelter,' 1 »folte House Conference on Fallout
Protection , January 25, I960, r>. 22.
19
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense ; Twenty-First Intermediate Report,




there will be no shelter program. 20 Many federal advocates
believe that the Federal government has greater resources than
the states which cannot execute the comprehensive planning and
construction required for civil defense in the nuclear age.
Director Hoegh believes the Federal government by failure to
provide funds for incorporating shelters in Federal buildings
has greatly impeded the motivation needed to gain support for
?1
state and local programs. This is pretty well backed up by
Mr. RIehlman, a member of the subcommittee who said, W I think
the chairman and I both agree that the Federal government must
take a greater Interest and greater stand in this field if we are
to get it accomplished." 22 Mr. Morgenstern says:
The present government has not faced up to the facts
of the situation. Neither has Congress, usually so
far ahead of the Administration, seen fit to take
action. Perhaps this is due to the sad circumstance
that our civil defense organization is a shambles. 23
The State of Washington indicates that a strong statement of
policy by the Congress and a similar statement by the President
regarding a shelter program would do much to assist the state to
Ok
take steps for survival.
2
Ibid ., p. A.
21
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense ; Hearings, op. cit
. . p. 51.
22
Ibid ., p. 59.
23^Askar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense
(New York: Random House, 1959), p. 1137"
24
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An evaluation of foreign civil defense capabilities is
necessary in order that a relative comparison can be made. It
appears that all eleven of the European countries with member-
ship in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are carrying out
civil defense programs of varying quality. Sweden and Switzer-
land, two countries that are not members of any military alli-
ance, have very active civil defense programs. Dr. Paul
McGrath, deputy Director of Intelligence and National Security
Affairs, of OCDM has summarized it:
At the present time the best non-military defense
capabilities in Western Europe are to be found in
Switzerland and the three Scandinavian countries.
The United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands have
strong civil defense organizations, but they have very
little effective shelter capacity. West Germany has
expanded its program somewhat. The other countries
of Western Europe are not significantly beyond the
planning stage. The Scandinavian countries have
laws providing for compulsory registration for civil
defense duties and all have expensive shelter programs.
Sweden, which may have the most advanced civil defense
program in the Free World, is noted for its deep shelters
both for population and industry. Deep-rock or concrete
shelters are now completed or are being built in or near
all Swedish cities with peacetime populations of at least
50,000. Each of these shelters will accommodate 5»000
to 15*000 persons and some are built with the dual
purpose of serving in peacetime as under-ground garages. 5
The Soviets also appear to believe that in modern
warfare the front-lines would be on the homefront. The USSR
maintains an elaborate civil defense system and a massive
2
-^Taul c. McGrath, Defense In the Nuclear Era , A
briefing presented by the Deputy Director of Intelligence and
National Security Affairs, OCDM, February 21, 1961, p. 11.
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civilian program of compulsory training. Civil defense has an
impact on the Soviet population by means of a massive civilian
training program which is run by the government with help from
the Communist Party. 6 The Soviet regime has been conducting
civil defense training; courses of required instruction for every
one of the more than 200 million Soviet citizens? during the past
six years. The 1961 program consists of 18 hours of obligatory
training in practical aspects of civil defense. Every civilian
in the USSR has both the opportunity and the duty to learn the
fundamentals of self-protection and survival in a post-nuclear
attack environment. The status of shelter protection for the
popul'ce is not known. It is apparent that the inclusion of
protective construction features is some apartment houses and
other new buildings has been a standard practice in many centers
of population and industry and that basement shelter already is
available to an important segment of the urban population in
many areas of the USSR. 2? The construction of solid-wall
basements with reinforced concrete ceilings provides a valuable
degree of protection against nuclear radiation.
The problem of civil defense In the USSR differs from
that In our country. First, because the Soviet program is
compulsory rather than voluntary as it If here. Secondly,
Soviet industrial and population centers are smaller and much
more widely dispersed. Third, the Soviet regime does not
reveal its civil defense expenditures in its published budget.
26
Ibid . . p. 14. 27Ibia. , p. 15.

100
Fourth, the many years of regimentation and police state
controls permit the ready mobilization of personnel and materiel
for any program desired by the Soviet rulers.
The Soviet civil defense system probably is spotty in
its effectiveness and it may be considerably less than adequate
in terms of defense against large-scale nuclear warfare.
Nonetheless, it clearly is one element of total defense and the
Soviet government has been devoting a considerable expenditure
of money and man hours to improving the program. Overall the
Russians appear to be further along the road to preparation
than the United States. Millions of peoples have received stern
training in civil defense, are instructed in first aid and
have at least a rudimentary acquaintance with tasks that have
to be performed after attack. The Russians, living a much more
Spartan life than we do, would find the new hardships nearer
their present existence and have shown in the last war how well
they are able to cope with the grim life of wartime destruc-
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The leadership of the United States in the International
affairs of the Free World in its contest with Soviet Russia
heading up the Communist World demands among other essential
elements a formidable position of military strength both active
end passive.
The military structure of the United States places main
reliance on a strong nuclear deterrent force comprise mainly
of the Strategic Air Command, Intercontinental Ballistic
?siles, and Polaris equipped submarines.
Inasmuch as the military positions of the two countries
are considered fairly equal in relative strength, it is
questionable whether one or the other or both would risk
annihilation by initiating or engaging in a nuclear contest.
However, on the basis that the intentions and designs
of world powers cannot be predicted, and considering the
precarious balance of international hostility that exists
between the United "tates and Soviet Pussia it is reasonable
to assume that war could break out as the result of certain
unresolved conditions arising.
It is, therefore, expedient that problems relating to




theatre of operations of a nuclear war will be world wide.
The protection of the population of the United States
then beoomes of primary importance and thus an evaluation of
shelter protection in relation to overall civil defense posture
has been undertaken.
The vulnerability of the population of the United States
today is extensive and nation wide. It is doubtful if 10
percent of the population could find or adapt shelter protec-
tion from radiation fallout in the event of a nuclear attack.
Studies have determined that up to 160 million Americans could
become casualties.
The Federal otovemment, through the Office of Civil
and Mobilization Defense, in cooperation with the states and
loc«l governments have an organized civil defense system aimed
at Inducing orivate home owners and local governments to
provide shelter protection. This program to date has proved a
failure mainly because of the apathy of the neonle, Congress
and the administration.
There are varied programs of shelters both of fallout
and blast characteristics that can in a relatively short time
be implemented. It is obvious that before anything concrete
can be done that Presidential leadership and Congressional






To neglect an analysis of Soviet doctrine and goals
would cloud this evaluation because the aggressive international
attitude of the Russians is directly reflected by their strong
military oosltion. We cannot ignore the fact that but for one
important agreement on the ban of nuclear tests the United
States and Russia have been unable to reach an international
bargaining position in the last five years. Just the atmosphere
of this situation is deplorable. The dangers of these two
military giants reaching an imoasse in the next ten years can
only be highlighted by the present unsolved problems of Berlin
and Laos, the nationalism of the African states and the "go
home Yankee" reaction that is paramount in many parts of the
world. A similar conflict of interests has in the recent past
produced two world wars where the international situations
were than even more tolerant than the present. The future is
not bright. It is gray and dismal. If this nation's survival
depends on the nuclear deterrent alone, in view of the immense




national leaders have failed in their overall judgment of United
States position.
The dimensions of the nuclear threat to the United
States have unfolded with shocking speed within the last two
years. First is the development of ICBM's within both the
United States and Russia thereby establishing both countries
on a relatively equal plane in respect of their military capa-
bilities, Second is the general agreement that active military
defenses are likely to be ineffective against large-scale
ballistic missile attacks for the foreseeable future.
The significance of this new and dangerous situation
does not necessarily increase the vulnerability of the United
States and the likelihood of a Russian attack. The deliberate
initiation of general nuclear war is considered unlikely at the
present. However, the immensity of this issue concerns the
asnects of survival in the United atates. Should general war
occur in the 1960*8, a capability will exist for delivering a
devastating nuclear attack against the continental United
States with little useful warning and without adequate active
military defense against ballistic delivery vehicles.
The transition into the missile era does not eliminate
the familiar problems of civil defense nor reduce the importance
of nhelter nrotectlon. On the contrary, these problems are
that much more enlarged and highlighted. Recent scientific
and military studies have warned of the declining effectiveness
of active military defense and have recommended that decisions
be made with respect to improvements in non-military defense as
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a matter of urgency. The effect of these studies has been to
generate a consensus favorable to a major exploration of the
potentials of passive defense measures both for the military
establishment and for the pooulation at large. The sharply
declining confidence in the effectiveness of active defenses
has resulted in an increased sense of need, v?ith respect to
the further development of passive defense.
Shelter Protection
general
One of the major conclusions of this evaluation of
non-military defense is that there are more oromising possi-
bilities for alleviating the disaster- of a nuclear vsar than
have been generally recognized. There appear to be possibi-
lities of providing inexoensive fallout orotection for people
and for the construction of blast shelters. There likewise
appear to be good possibilities of limiting the long-term
biological damage to the population resulting from total radia-
tion, of ensuring a minimum supply of food immediately after
the attack, of reconstructing destroyed industrial capital
vithin much less than a generation, '~nd of Integrating non-
military defense measures with other aspects of national defense,
Moreover, some hypothetical non-military defense systems that
have been examined seem to be capable of saving tens of millions
of lives in the face of conceivable enemy attacks, and of
preserving a foundation for meeting lorig-run radiation hazards
.
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and for post-attack economic recuperation.
Population Protection
Shelter appears to be the key element in protection of
the population and far from effective than any foreseeable
anti-ICBM system for protecting the population against the
affects of nuclear attack. .c cording to the studies presented
in this evaluation, fallout shelter alone would reduce casual-
ties by 50 to 80 percent depending upon assumptions regarding
enemy targeting philosophy, circumstances under which the
attack might occur, time of attaok, etc. Even if a successful
terminal intercept anti-ICBM were developed the population
would still be vulnerable to a fallout attack from missiles
which escaped destruction. Thus there appears to be no
foreseeable defense against fallout except by shelter.
For these reasons shelter for the Population is
regarded as an essential part of balanced military strength and,
consequently, as an integral part of a successful deterrent
posture. Without shelter for the population, survival and
recovery would be little affected by other passive defense
measures
.
It must be emphasized that our entire civil defense
system is worthless without a system of shelter protection.
The practicalities of preserving an expensive civil defense
administration like OCDM an^ the expenditure to date of over a
billion dollar" is without justification if the er\6 product
is not to be adequate shelter protection to provide for




State shelter programs have not been successful and
relatively few individual shelters of all tynes have been
voluntarily constructed. ihe failure of the state programs to
reach their objectives is in part a reflection of federal
weaknesses. Although the subcommittee takes the view that a
comprehensive nationwide shelter program should replace the
present system which depends upon individual action in coopera-
tion with state and local program, this ohilosophy is not fully
concurred with. It is realized, however, that the main weak-
nesses of the administration of the nation's shelter program
are within the federal domain. Take the attitude of the city
of New Haven, Connecticut for example".
The President, the Congress, and many of the members
of the Armed Forces have let it appear to the people
that our power of retaliation is sufficient to prevent
a orobable attack. State and local governments have
thus been induced to hold civil defense expenditures
to the minimum. Industry follows the lead of Govern-
ment. Under these conditions people find it difficult
to understand why it is important for them to build
home fallout shelters when government and industry
miSEi ad serious efforts to do st.°
There is substantial Indication that there is much ^ is satis-
faction on the part of state aftd local officials with respect
to the national shelter policy in terms of federal participation,
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil Defense ; Twenty-First Intermediate Report,
86th Cons. , 2d Sess., ¥<?shington, D. C, P.eoort No. 2069, I960,
p. 2.
2
U. 3. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, Civil ..ofe,-e; ; Hearings, 36th Cong., 2d 3ess.,
Washington, D. C. , I960, p. 353.
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The general lack of progress In the construction of all types
of shelters was variously attributed to an absence of Federal
guidance, lack of funds at state and local levels, conflicting
philosophies of evacuation and shelter construction, insuffi-
cient incentives offered by the Federal government, the lack
of direct Federal assistance, and in some cases, problems
relating to local building codes and property assessments for
local tax purposes. Almost all the mayors and governors
responding to the subcommittee's questionnaire reported an
alarming lack of fallout protection in public school buildings. -
Governor Orville Freeman saya:
The Federal program contradicts itself. Counties
and municipalities look to the states for leadership
and the citizens look to the local government in
turn. There is insufficient direct Federal assistance
to local counties and state governments to enable
them to carry out their responsibilities.^
Thus our shelter protection as of this date is negli-
gible and our civil defense system as a result is archaic and
ineffectual in its capability to meet 1960-1970 passive defense
requirements. If this present system is not designed to
shortly bring into being a Federal government sponsored formal
shelter program, then a waste of public funds is occurring—
funds that could be used to increase our defensive deterrent
3
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Civil Defense ; Twenty-First Intermediate Report,
op. clt .. p. 12.
4
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Shelter and Public Acceptance
To analyze the wide spectrum of public attitude and to
define the reason why no significant shelter program is under
way necessitate an appreciation of human relations. There are
primarily too many negative variations of opinion that have
been formed by failure of the people to fully understand the
complete impact of nuclear war. Most of the public's ideas and
reactions are based on "half-truths" that prevent a formidable
public reaction from taking place. These "half-truths" are
the stepchildren of secret sensitive data about nuclear weapons
tests and effects that the government has released only within
the past few years. ;hen this classified data was finally
given to the public in the form of newspaper and magazine
publications, distortions and exaggerations warped the facts
which resulted in the public forming a wide variation of
opinions and attitudes that are in many cases far from the
official truth. OCDK's efforts to educate the American people
have been resisted to date and it is unlikely that under the
present conditions of public fear, apathy, disinterest and
neglect that any programs instituted by OCDM will change the
opinion of the present generation of voters.
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
It is not difficult to understand the tremendous
obstacles that are facing OCDM in its efforts to establish a
workable program. The main reason the shelter program as
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sponsored by OCDM has felled Is not because of OCDM; it is not
because of failure on the part of Congress; it is not because
of the lack, of state and local motivation; it is simply because
the present and the past administrations have not considered
it as a national requirement.
The political impact of a federally sponsored national
shelter urogram is impressive. The gaining of public support
to expend large outlays of funds for an unpopular project is
foremost. If this could be accomplished it would then be
necessary to convince a reluctant Congress of the need of such
a program. The budget requirements for this program would
require a major administrative decision. Finally, international
considerations regarding the strategic value of such a program
are evident and they would have to be weighed against the
funds being appropriated for military defense.
It is apparent from the viewpoint of past administra-
tions that the defensive posture of the United States does not
require the inclusion of a federally sponsored shelter program.
As a result of this position OCDM serves as a political
expedient for both Congress and the President. In its more
or less semi-dormant status it carries out functions of limited
civil defense that neither satisfy nor radically irritate the
majority of American voters. It thus ably serves the designs
of the administration in that it cannot be righteously
accused of neglecting the welfare and protection of the
people.
This opinion is in no way a criticism of OCDM. On the

Ill
contrary it Is a recognition of the difficulties and handicap
this organization is obliged to work under. In spite of
unenthusiastic backing by the President and Congress since
CCDM'e inception, the Agency has managed to devise a shelter
program that can prove effective if it should get a go-ahead
from the administration.
There is little doubt that the most effective shelter
program would emphasize construction of fallout shelters, or
at least improvement of existing basements, in a band ten to
forty or more miles outside of likely target cities, keyed to
detailed traffic plans for evacuation to these shelters in the
I
hours following an enemy first strike on SAG bases.-' A certain
amount of fallout shelter would need to be built or improvised
in the cities for the use of those workers and residents of
the central areas of large cities who could not hope to escape
to shelter beyond the range of direct weapons effects, in the
time between strikes on military targets and the arrival of
fallout.
The main problem to the above program is that if we
decide to restrict ourselves to fall-out shelters, which can
clearly not be built for large cities without required blast
shelters, a new and grave social problem arises. It may
produce serious troubles. People living in the large cities
-
^on-Military Defense , Wiscons in—A Case Study
,
ed. William K. Chipman (Proceedings of a Conference at
The Wisconsin Center), University of Wisconsin, Madison,
October 1-3, 1959, p. 14.
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will know that they are to be sacrificed in case of large-scale
war, while those living in the country, on farms, in small
communities will have a better chance of survival. This chance
would not be 3ue to a limitation of the enemy's weapons and
capabilities. It would be due to our own protective measures,
which could be applied only to a part of the population. This
obstacle is without doubt the main reason why the administration
is unwilling to proceed with a large scale nationally sponsored
fallout shelter program.
A second-best approach for the present would therefore
be for states to encourage or to require construction of simple
home shelters, and to survey existing basement shelter in areas
surrounding cities. Plans should also be made for rapid
improvement of these basement areas in time of crisis and for
evacuation to such perpheral shelters as had been made ready
prior to an attack. The home- shelter program might generate
enough concern that the national shelter policy could be modi-
fied to provide for joint federal-state construction of shelters
in the areas surrounding likely target cities.
'with respect to individual family fallout shelter
construction on the do-it-yourself basis, the subcommittee has
Indicated its belief that the most important single inducement
the Federal government could offer would be to allow individual
income tax deductions, with appropriate limits, for the cost
of constructing private shelters. This type of Federal incen-
tive, more than any other was advocated by governors and mayors




There is no doubt that people in high positions of
government, people that have had access to official documents
and people that understand the survival probabilities following
a nuclear war realize the dramatic imoortance and need of
shelter protection for the population. The fact that an
official branch of the administration hp-s failed to stir the
desired public reaction is no Justification for condemnation
of OCDJT. Within the realm of the Federal government there has
been established a national organization that has by adminietra*
tion, research, operation and education laid the essential
groundwork for the implementation of a national shelter program
but has been prevented from carrying it out only by the legis-
lative and political climate within which it works. The
results of subcommittee hearings confirms this opinion.
Governor iioegh works in M9 environment of authority
and resr>one.1bi] ity which is grossly inadequate to
the national need. S<§ .Latter ho\: hard he works
at hit present job, it is too narrowly circumscribed
by national law and policy to achieve the tasks that
must be achieved if this Nation is to be assured the
essentials of survival.
7
It is not believed that public opinion is ready to
support any voluntary shelter program now or in the immediate
future. Ironically many congressmen are likewise reluctant to
add their influence. If the administration waits for public
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urgency to develop to eventually force the government into
action it will be remiss in its public responsibility—for at
that time it may be too latft* '"hat is urgently required is
executive leadership of the highest order where the President
makes a personal appeal to both the public and the law-makers
to enact fi federally sponsored shelter program. This is
supported by the subelicittee:
recommend the creation of a Cabinet-level Federal
agency vested with broad statutory authority and
charged with the responsibility of planning ant3
administering ft national civil defense program.
°
The subcommittee in a letter to the President urged that he
plsy a more influential role by assigning to civil defense a
responsibility Mi an allocation of resource? by the Federal
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